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VINTRODUCTION
Ju Aug. 3, 19 1 o the Federal Trade Commission began an
investigation into whether pharmacists should be permitted to
substitute less costly generic versions of prescription drugs
in place of the brand name drugs called for by doctors.
The commission noted that consumers spend about $7.5
billion annually on prescription drugs purchased through
retail pharmacies, of which 40 per cent are drugs marketed
by more than one company.
The investigation represented a triumph of hope over
experience. Several times before over the past decade, the
FDA, as well as other federal agencies and three Congressional
committees, had tried to foster more widespread use of the less
expensive generics. Each attempt ended in failure. Brand
name drugs, almost always more expensive than their generic
counterparts, are an integral part of the American Health Care
Delivery system, a system super-resistant to change from without.
Such federal actions as the FDA's often have predecessors
on the state level. This thesis is a study of the first state
law aimed at encouraging the more frequent use of generic
*
versions, passed by Massachusetts in 1970. The law, like
its federal counterparts, was a failure. But its experience is
* The official name of the law is "An Act creating a drug
formulary commission in the department of public health and
requiring doctors, when prescribing brand names to write the
generic name of the drug." Mercifully, the name was shortened
to "Generic Drug Law" or "Drug Formulary Law," in both official
and popular usage.
vi
instructive, not only about the < achusetts state govern-
men 't
*
ab°ut the politics of the American health industry
as well.
a he Massachusetts law required physicians who wrote
prescriptions for brand name drugs to also include the names
*
ci the generic versions so the purchaser could decide which
2
one to buy.
A brand name is given to a drug by the firm that creates
it. The firm has a 17-year patent period to market the drug
exclusively and recover its research outlay. At the end of
the patent period, competing firms may make and market the
drug
.
Such firms usually sell the drug under its generic or
chemical name, often a shorthand combination of its chemical
ingredients, registered with the federal government at the
3
start of the patent period.
Because of the market advantage in the 17-year patent
period and because competing firms have little or no research
investment to recover, they can offer their generic versions
** 4
at lower, often drastically lower prices. Thus, for
* The term generic drug is a broad one and the user may
be open to criticism on those grounds. However, for the pur-
poses of this paper, "generic drug" shall mean prescription
drug products that are sold under non-brand or chemical names,
and will suffice.
** Because new drugs are constantly being marketed and patents
on others constantly are expiring, it is difficult to pinpoint
the percentage of drugs on the market available by generic name.
In 1975, Consumer Reports estimated that "about 35 per cent of
drugs are no longer under patent (but) only some 10 per cent of
prescriptions are written generically. .
.
(Jan. 1975, pp. 3-6)
In 1974 a Food and Drug Administration expert told a Con-
gressional Committee that of the 200 top drugs, which accounted
for about 70 per cent of total usage, about half would be ofi
patent by 1980. (U. S. Senate Subcommittee on Health of the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare Brand lames and i.enerics
hearings, July 22, 1974, pp. 87-89.)
v i i
example, one prominent drug catalogue lists the price for
1G0 tablets of the brand name tranquilizer Miltown as $6.10,
while the same number of tablets of the generic version,
neprobomate, is $1.00. Another catalogue lists 100 tablets
of Miltown as costing $7.70 compared to $1.15 for 100 tablets
of Meprobamate.
L
It was to enable the consumer to take advantage of such
price differences that State Rep. I. Edward Serlin, D-Mattapan,
filed the legislation which eventually led to the Generic Drug
Law. A high proportion of Serlin' s constituents were elderly
and they would benefit most of any group if drug prices were
7lowered. Where the average American spends $33 a year on
prescription drugs, those over 65 spend an average of $74 and
nearly one in five spends more than $100 annually. Although
they account for only 10 per cent of the population, those over
Q65 buy 25 per cent of all prescription drugs sold.
But neither Serlin' s elderly constituents nor any other
Massachusetts citizens benefitted from his law. In filing his
bill, Serlin had opened a can of worms and had rekindled a
controversy over prescription drugs begun a decade before by
U.S. Sen. Estes Kefauver, D-Tenn., and which continues today.
Lobbyists for the nation's brand name drug makers and for Massa-
chusetts doctors and druggists killed the Serlin bill for two
years. When in the third year, it looked as though the tide
for passage of such a bill was becoming too great to swim
against, the lobbyists helped fashion a compromise which enabled
passage of a severely watered-down bill that proved to be
viii
unworkable. Subsequent attempts to strengthen the law through
amendments have been blocked by lobbyists in four legislative
sessions
.
To understand the debates and maneuverings which went on over
the Massachusetts drug bill, the author feels that a familiarity
with the background in the 10-year-old controversy over generics
is necessary. Therefore, the first chapter of this four-chapter
thesis is devoted to: l) an examination of the largely scientific
question of the equivalency of different versions of a prescription
drug; and 2) a discussion of the two main participants in the debate
over generics, the FDA and the prescription drug industry. This
examination has the added benefit of providing a federal
dimension to the Massachusetts controversy over generics.
The second and third chapters deal with the Massachusetts
Generic Drug Law. The second chapter details the three year
life of the bill that finally became the drug law, the lobbying
for and against it and the reactions of key legislators. The
third chapter follows the law’s progress through its early years
in the state Department of Public Health, and then examines
efforts to amend and strengthen the law. The fourth chapter
contains the author’s conclusions.
A word about methodology: The second and third chapters,
and to some extent the fourth, are based on interviews with
legislators, lawyers, lobbyists, doctors and druggists who were
in some way involved with the drug bill or law. Where a point
of information was obtained in an interview, and where the
source is apparent in the text, footnotes have been excluded.
ix
FOOTNOTES
INTRODUCTION
1. News Item 9 Drug Industry's Sales Practices to be Studied .
Wall Street Journal, Aug. 3, 1976,~ p. 3.
2. Interview, Serlin, July, 1975.
3. Burack, Richard, Dr., Handbook of Prescription Druus .
4. Ibid.
5. Interstate Drug Exchange, Inc., Winter-Spring 1976 Catalog
.
p. 18.
6. Sherry, Inc., 1976 Medical Surgical Catalog , pp. 12, 50.
7. Interview, Serlin, op. cit.
8. News Commentary Prescription Drug Prices .^ay Be on Wav
Down . New York Daily News, June 6, 1976, p. C9.
1CHAPTER I
"I do not know what we are going to do here," U. 5. Sen.
Edward M» Kennedy, D-iVla ss
. ,
said to the witness, an eminent
teaching physician. "They say the (drug) standards are good
enough. You say that the standards are not good enough..."
The senator, chairing a hearing of his subcommittee on
Health and Labor, had run into the seemingly endless dispute
over the safety of the nation’s drug supply. Like other sena-
tors before him, Kennedy was attempting to settle the question
of whether all marketed versions of a prescription drug are
safe enough to be used interchangeably. He had received
different answers from medical and pharmaceutical experts.
1
wfhat puzzled Kennedy also puzzles laymen. Scientists
have been enshrined in our society as keepers of the truth and
problem solvers. Thus political sophisticates and laymen alike
are often bewildered when scientific testimony appears contra-
dictory. The scientists testify with the dogma of the laboratory,
but their conclusions are filtered by economic interest and
refracted by social and political value judgments.
The confusion that occurs when scientists fail to agree
whether a nuclear power plant is safe, a breakfast food healthful
or a food additive dangerous, is because "safe, 5 "healthful, and
"dangerous" are concepts loaded with social and political value
judgments.
For years the experts have been at odds over the question
of the quality of the nation's drug supply. Recent attempts
2
by federal health officials to implement a program encouraging
use of generics by Medicaid and Medicare patients have only
-£
intensified the dispute* Attempts have been opposed by the
manufacturers of trade name prescription drugs, in the person
of their trade organization, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
2Association. Its 131 member companies stand to suffer
considerable financial losses if generics are used more frequent-
ly, but the PMA insists its opposition is based mainly on the
existence of differences in therapeutic performance between some
generics and brand name drugs.
A New York Times reporter may well have had Kennedy’s
hearings and the drug question in mind when he wrote recently
about the problem of experts with conflicting views: "Whom
is the public to believe? How are the decision makers in
government and industry to sort out the conflicting testimony?
What are the facts? And what are only the opinions of scientists
speaking as citizens and not as experts?
"...the conflicting public statements of the experts
often adds to the confusion of a controversy and all but
paralyze the decision making process." From Science Considers
Its Own Court . Feb. 29, 1976, section 5, page 8.
The key issue in the dispute over drug safety, according
to two prominent pharmacologists, Wardell and Lasagna, "is how
to determine the point where accommodations are to be made
between safety and efficiency in the approval of drugs for the
market," or, in economic terms, the acceptable cost-benefit
ratio. They add, "Most of the debate... (on drug quality)...
stems from disagreement as to what constitutes evidence of safety
and efficiency..."
In less exact but more philosophical fashion, Silverman
and lee conclude: "In this less than perfect world, there
can never be absolute guarantees that all generic products
will inevitably be biologically or chemically equivalent.
There can never be guarantee of such equivalence for all
batches of the same product made by the same manufacturer.
Pills. Profits and Politics . Berkeley: 1974, University of
California Press, p. 159.
3
MThe root of the drug quality dispute," according to a
recent PMA statement, "and its relationship to the brand-generics
issue, lies partly in the term bioavailability: the degree and
rate of absorption of the active ingredient, which determines
the amount available at the target site in the body." 3
Generics may be chemically equivalent to their brand name
counterparts, the PMA argues, but still may be inferior in terms
of bioavaiiability, and this can pose a hazard to health. Drugs
with the same chemical ingredients do not always produce the
same reactions in the body:
Even though two drugs made by different manufacturers
contain the same active ingredients, their effects on
patients may vary. Variations can occur in purity, potency,
weight, disintegration time, d issolution time and stability.
Nonactive ingredients such as binders, coaters, fillers and
lubricants can also vary from manufacturer to manufacturer
and they affect drug quality in important ways.
All of these factors, and others, determine how fast
and thoroughly a drug dissolves and sends its active ingredients
to a different part of the body. This is known as bioavaila3®
bility. Drug products that exhibit comparable bioavaiiability
characteristics are considered to be bioequivalent. Otherwise
they are bioinequivalent and may not have the same therapeutic
effect on patients.
A spokesman for the PMA, Richard Hamilton, elaborated:
"We are not against generic drugs per se. Our- member companies
produce generic drugs and have an awful lot on the market.
We’re just worried about the source of the drug ... There was
some very high quality generic drugs on the market ... It's
4the potential for inequivalence.” The potential for in-
equivalence, Hamilton, contended, is mainly with the lesser-
known and smaller companies, which are not members of the
PMA. They manufacture mostly generics. There are about
1200 such firms and the PMA points out that they are mostly
regional and do little or no drug research or development. ^
Further, the PMA has charged that the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration cannot assure that bioinequivalent drugs are kept
off the market. ”... drug product formulation failures occur
even among antibiotics certified as safe and effective,
batch by batch, by the Food and Drug Administration, FDA
has an impressive surveillance capability, but it is not
adequate to assure that all manufacturers are equally
competent.”
Federal attempts to encourage generic prescribing
are opposed by the PMA on grounds that such attempts are
intrusions upon the physician’s professional judgment as to
the superiority of certain drug versions. ”The issue is
not whether doctors should be allowed to prescribe gener-
ically. They can do that now if they want," the PMA has
written. "The real issue is whether they should be com-
pelled to.”
The PMA, moreover, disputes claims of consumer advocates
that there are substantial gains to be made from widespread use
of generics and assert that "the consistent quality of the product
is the key — not whether it is prescribed by generic or brand
name.’ Programs to encourage use of generics, the PMA has also
warned, may have the unforeseen effect of discouraging the
research and development of new drugs, performed exclusively by
7brand name drug makers.
Federal officials and consumer advocates dismiss the
importance of bioequivalence in all but a few cases — mainly
those involving the seriously ill. Proponents of generics
maintain that in most instances, a high degree of bioinequivalence
can be tolerated. One senior official of the FDA, for instance,
declared recently that M the problem of bioequivalence (of
generics) is limited to a small fraction of drug products ...
for the overwhelming majority of available drug products there is
no evidence of a bioequivalence problem." ® FDA Commissioner
Alexander Schmidt, a physician, has said:
"As an individual, I ask for drugs by their
generic name for myself and my family. As a physician,
I prescribe drugs by their generic name for my patient.
And as a professor of medicine, I teach my medical
9
students to prescribe drugs by their generic name.
Some federal officials and consumer advocates maintain
that the PMA*s motive in disputing the quality of generics is
6fear of economic loss. U. S. Sen. Gaylord Nelson, D-Wisconsin,
whose Subcommittee on Small Business and Monopoly has been
probing the drug industry since 1966, has saids
The drug industry is fleecing the people by
trying to convince them through high-powered
advertising that drugs sold under brand name
are somehow or other more reliable than the
same drugs sold under their official (generic)
name, for one-half to one-thirtieth as much. 10
Consumer advocate Ralph Nader has charged*
...the drug companies have persuaded doctors
that generics are bad. Well, there* s substantial evi-
dence to prove that generics, with a very few excep-
tions, are just as high quality as brand products...
What*s disturbing is that this information isn’t
getting across in the billion dollars of
advertising. H
Further, federal officials point out that manufacturing
and marketing practices have blurred the once-clear distinction
between brand and generic. No longer is it easy to determine
the source of a particular prescription drug. And Joseph Graedon
wrote in "The People’s Pharmacy”*
There are very few companies that actually manufacture
antibiotics. A relatively few firms produce the major
bulk of the products and then sell them to lots of other
pharmaceutical suppliers for distribution. While over 70
companies, for example, supply tetracycline as either a
generic product or a brand name product, it was dis-
covered ... that only four firms manufacture the bulk
ingredient within the United States, according to the
* A very recent report of the General Accounting Office charged
the FDA with failing to follow certain procedures in testing new
drugs which the GAO warned could allow for less than safe drugs
being put on the market. However, the GAO report also criticized
the major drug manufacturers, who test the drugs, for also fail-
ing to follow procedures. ( News Item U.S. Agency Finds j3ju£
Testing Lax . New York Times, July 21, 1976, p. 1)
7U.S. I arix f Commission* No more than 10 firms manufacture
the final dosage form. ^
Dr. Henry Simmons, director of the FDA’s Bureau of Drugs,
has noted increasing instances where "the manufacturer is
providing to a large number of firms the same drug, which is
then marketed under a wide variety of brand and generic names."
In this vein, Simmons noted*
"For years, the large brand name manufacturers
have been major providers of generic drugs. Recent
events indicate that more and more generics will be
manufactured by traditionally brand name manu-
facturers... as expense involved in maintaining
manufacturing facilities for a full line of drugs
rises, more and more manufacturers — large and small,
generic and brand — are selling to each other either
bulk drugs or finished dosage forms."
Simmons added that "On the basis of data we have accrued
to date, we cannot conclude there is a significant difference
in quality between the generic and brand name product tested"
13
in the Bureau of Drugs experiments.
Nevertheless, the brand-generic controversy persists.
In holding hearings on drug safety, Kennedy’s subcommittee was
pursuing a line of inquiry begun in 1959 with the Subcommittee
on Small Business and Monopoly, led by Sen. Estes Kefauver,
D-Tenn. Probing pricing practices and the structure of the drug
industry, the subcommittee heard testimony highly critical of
8the drug industry, the price of drugs and the lack of drug
standards.
The hearings resulted in the so-called Kefauver-Harris
amendments to the lood, Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938, which
signalled the start of an era of government interest in the
*
drug industry. Officially known as the Drug Industry Act
of 1962, the amendments for the first time required M sub-
stantial evidence” of the safety and efficacy of new drua
products. fhe amendments also strengthened government control
lb
over drug advertising.
Kefauver f s successor as committee chairman, Sen. Nelson,
continued the inquiry into the drug industry. In 1966, Nelson,
at President Lyndon B. Johnson’s request, asked the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare to form a task force on
prescription drugs to conduct the most extensive study ever
16
of the drug makers and the question of bioequivalence.
The task force study was based on surveys, advice of
medical experts and potency tests of 4,600 drugs. In its
initial report in 1968, the task force concluded that ’’lack
of clinical equivalence (or bioequivalence) among chemical
equivalents (generics) meeting all official standards has been
17
grossly exaggerated as a major hazard to public health.”
The potency tests showed that 7.8 percent of generic drugs
and 8.8 percent of trade name drugs tested were unacceptable.
* It is unlikely that the legislation, the wisdom of whichis
still being disputed, would have passed if not for the thalidomide
disaster, according to Wardell and Lasagna. ,, 'Ihe fact that
thalidomide had not been approved for U.S. marketing was somehow
irrelevant, they added.
Regulation and Drug Development, Washington 197b, American
Enterprise Institute, p. 6.
9While the task force pointed out that this by no means established
the superiority of generics over trade name drugs, neither did the
statistics support the reverse proposition. The task force
study stated:
Where low cost . chemical equivalents have been
employed — in foreign drug programs, in leading
American hospitals, in state welfare programs, in
Veteran's Administration and Public Health Service
hospitals, and in American military installations —
instances of clinical nonequivalency have seldom
been reported, and few of these have had significant
therapeutic consequences,
After the release of the task force study, the debate
*
over drug quality seems to have abated. In 1973 it was
revived when Casper Weinberger, secretary of the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, unveiled the proposed Maximum
Allowable Cost Program (MAX) Under this program, to reduce
drug expenses, price ceilings would be put on some of the drugs
most commonly prescribed for Medicaid, Medicare and Public Health
Service patients. Controls also would be put on fees reimbursing
pharmacists who buy and dispense the drugs; and lists would be
distributed to physicians and pharmacists of drug prices of less
expensive substitutes. Projected savings of the program were
$60 million of the $3 billion the government spends annually on
** IQdrugs.
A key feature of MAX would be the list of maximum prices
the government would reimburse pharmacists for certain drugs.
* The PMA published a critique of the task force study, entitled
Brands v. Generics, in 1971.
** The AMA, PMA and National Association of Retain Druggists have
all ppposed MAC and have filed a suit challenging it in Federal
District Court in Chicago. The suit is still pending and the
program went into effect Aug. 26. News Item Coy |,t .
—
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the Cost of Drugs. New York Times, Aug. 23, 1976, p. 11
10
The task of deciding which drugs were safe enough in both brand
and generic version to be included on the list fell to Kennedy*
s
subcommittee. At its request, the U.S. Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) undertook a study of drug bioequivalence. The
study concluded that the problem of bioequivalence existed with
20
some drugs but was not a factor for most. ' The chairman of
the OTA panel, Robert Berliner, dean of the Yale University
School of Medicine, estimated that 85 to 90 per cent of chemically
equivalent drugs on the market presented no therapeutic equivalence
problems and could be used interchangeably on a MAX list. "Most
21
drugs ought to be prescribed generically
,
M he said. But the OTA
study did not resolve the major question facing the Kennedy
subcommittee — whether generic versions could be used inter-
changeably with brand name counterparts. H The CTA report could
be read as a victory for either side" in the bioequivalence
debate, one Massachusetts public health official, a druggist,
22
commented.
The debate over drug quality gives no indication of expiring.
Not even the prestigious National Academy of Sciences managed to
avoid the snarls of the debate. While the OTA study was proceeding,
a panel of the Academy* s National Research Council issued a study
of the wisdom of state laws forbidding pharmacists from substituting
one version of a drug for another prescribed by the physician.
The panel urged the repeal of the anti-substitution laws passed in
the early 1950' s, when the quality of the drug supply was inferior
to today's. The panel report stated that "no inherent reason exists
for choosing the more expensive drug product simply because of
brand name familiarity.” 23
11
There followed a series of vociferous complaints about the
panel report from, among others, the PMA. In July, 1975, the
academy issued a ”clarif ication” of its report, stating that "it
may be necessary to change, but not repeal, drug anti-substitution
laws in some states to make these laws consistent with modern con-
cepts of bioavailability of drugs and medical practice.” 24 *
The panel’s study had been undertaken in response to an
announcement in 1971 that the American Pharmaceutical Association
was reversing its stand against the repeal of anti-substitution
laws as part of its demand for recognition of the professional
right of the pharmacist to make decisions about prescription
drugs. The APhA, representing about a third, or 38,000 of
the nation’s druggists, made the announcement in a white paper,
"The Pharmacist’s Role in Product Selection." In part, it stated:
Comparable drug products that meet the
official standards and specifications are, for all
practical purposes, therapeutically equivalent in
all but a relatively few cases...
Some instances of therapeutic nonequivalence go
undetected or unreported, but the generally low level
of reported instances demonstrates that the problem
cannot be widespread. —
* What can only be described as a comedy of misinterpretation —
if not error - preceded and postdated the panel’s resolution, The
details were recounted for Senator Nelson during his subcommittee’s
hearings. (U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business, Sub-
committee on Monopoly
,
Hearings on the Prescription Drug. Industry
parts 3 to 5, Washington: 1974, Government Printing Office, pp
1178-9 part 26).
** Skeptics, some druggists among them, suggest the APhA change of
heart was due in no small part to the fact that pharmacists - with
the advent of government, or third party payment for prescriptions,
which was on a straight fee and not percentage basis - no longer had
anything to loose financially with more widespread use of low cost
generics, (interview, Denmark, Tattlebaum)
12
of ore issuing the paper, the APhA had been on record opposed to
appeal of the anti-substitution laws, a position it shared with th
PMA and AMA, and to which they still subscribe. After the paper was
issued, the PMA and AMA criticized the APhA — as did its own Academy
of Pharmaceutical Sciences, which issued a dissenting report.
It is not unusual to find the AMA and PMA on the same side of
an issue, least of all if it concerns drugs. Indeed, the AMA has
even shared lobbyists with the PMA in its fight against the proposed
M/>X program. The arrangement came to light last year after a dis-
gruntled AMA employee leaked a set of memos on the lobbying arrange-
ment, and who was quickly dubbed "Sore Throat" after the unnamed
27
news source of Watergate fame. ~ And when the AMA last year bee arm
the first organization to file suit to block the MAC program. The
New York Daily News, in a commentary, noteds
What is surprising about the suit... is that it was filed
by the AMA and not by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers* Asso-
ciation. Logically, it should be the drug lobby, not the
doctors* lobby, that would be most upset by the new regulation- .
.
The fact that the AMA files suit underlines how closely
linked are the economic well-being of the AMA and the drug
industry. Much of the medical association's retirement fund
is invested in the stock market, and 10 per cent of the stocks
in the portfolio, representing S>10 million, is invested in
drug stocks.
In a typical year, the AMA also derives about 25 per cent
of its operating income from drug advertising published in
its journals... *
* Would drug firms use the power of advertising expenditures to
attempt to influence policy? Recently the New York Times published
a five-part series on medical iincompetence, which included some
uncomplimentary conclusions concerning drugs and their use by
physicians and promotion by drug companies. Within a month,
pharmaceutical concerns had cancelled advertising worth .#500,000
from Modern Medicine, a magazine owned by The New York Times
Company. An officer of the magazine said that those advertisers
who canceled their advertisements felt that "you don't feed
people who beat you." ( News Item Druci Ads
Series . Feb. 10, 1976, p. 27.
)
13
...Washington observers recall that the AMA often has
supported the drug industry whenever legislation or
regulations are impending that might fetter the industry... 28
And as late as 1973, the last two chairmen and the vice chairman
of the AMA' s Council on Drugs were accusing the association of
being "a captive of and beholden to the pharmaceutical industry." 2^
The financial links between the AMA and PMA extend to
individual doctors. The PMA-member firms, the nation* s major
drug makers, spend $1 billion annually for promotional activities
aimed at convincing the nation's 200,000-odd prescribing physicians
of the superiority of their products. 30
There is no doubting the extent or effect of this promotion*
The primary sources of news about new drug products are not scien-
31tific articles, but drug salesmen and ads in medical journals.
The main methods of promotion are* 1) Visits to doctors
by drug salesmen or "detail men" as they are called by their
employers; 2) mailing of brochures and free samples; 3) advertising
in medical journals which have no subscription costs; and 4) exhibits
at medical society meetings.
These promotional methods were described more colorfully by
a former medical director at Squibb, a physician, when he told the
Kefauver Subcosmittee of ”... the trip hammer effects of weekly
mailings, the regular visits by detail men, the two-page spreads,
and the ads which appear six times in the same journal, not to
mention the added inducement of the free cocktail party and the
golf ooting complete with three golf balls stamped with the
name of the drug company and the doctor in contrasting colors."
14
One observer has estimated that it would take several mail
110 large mail trucks and 800 postmen to deliver the daily load
of drug circulars and samples to doctors if mailed to one
single city. 34
As for free samples of pharmaceuticals for doctors,
Kennedy revealed in 1974, from information supplied to him by
the 20 largest drug companies, that during the preceding year,
they gave 12.8 million gifts to members of the health care
profession, more than 45 million reminder items (calendars,
pens, etc.) and 2,062,953,486 dosage units of drug samples —
enough to give 10 dosage units to everyone in the country.
The ubiquitousness of this advertising was driven home
by a 35-year-old physician who told the Kennedy Subcommittee
of drug industry gifts and favors he received over the span of
his career. His testimony indicated, according to one account:
...(he) started accepting drug samples, gifts and
junkets from ’detail men* of drug houses as long ago
as 1958, when a junior student in Maryland College of
Pharmacy. He was still on the receiving end of drug
industry largesse 12 or 13 years later as a full-fledged
doctor with a medical fellowship in a big public
hospital... As told by (him and other) physicians,
pharmaceutical houses are unstinting in their solicitude
for the nation’s doctors, starting at the outset of
medical school... 36
Once in practice, doctors have little time to spend
studying the developments in the pharmaceutical profession and
come to rely on the detail man for such information. The detail
man is by far the most costly promotional expense, accounting
for 70 per cent of the promotional budget. There are about
22,000 detail men and about 1,000 are employed by each of the
20 largest drug makers. Surveys show that the detail man is
15
well-received by physicians.
However, critics say the detail man is first and foremost
a salesman and his information is likely to be biased in favor
oc
of his company* s particular product. One among a parade
of former detail men to appear before the Kennedy Subcommittee
told of the extent to which a firm will go to sell its product:
"To persuade the doctor or pharmacist to use your brand or
generic drug usually required some extra enticing. At Pfizer
we sometimes sponsored contests and offered prizes for those
who bought our generic drugs." The aforementioned former
detail man displayed a catalogue used for such contests, which
offered prizes for varying amounts of drugs purchased. If a
physician ordered 1,000 doses of polio vaccine, for example,
he got an upright freezer with a 5-cubic foot capacity; for
50 doses he received a Craig rechargeable electronic calculator;
for 250 doses, a physician bag or cassete tape recorder. And
detail men got similar prizes for selling certain quantities
of drugs. 40
The nation* s major drug manufacturers can easily afford
the billion dollar annual outlay for promotion, which is but a
41
tenth of the amount spent on prescription drugs in 1975.
Moreover, the drug industry consistently is among the leading
profit makers in American business, as the chief economist of
the Federal Trade Commission pointed out for the Nelson Sub-
committee:
Losses, or even low profits, are practically
16
unheard of among large drug companies. In this
respect the drug industry is practically unique
among important American industries... Large druc,
companies not only earn a higher return than any
other of the major manufacturing industries shown,but none of the drug companies experience profit
rates be.*.ow 5 per cent ... No other industry matcheddrugs in the frequency with which companies had
profit rates exceeding 15 per cent. 42
Since 1961, the subcommittee was told, the drug industry has
ranked first or second among the 500 largest U.S. industrial
corporations in terms of return on investors' equity:
R£JIRN$ OfjmUHY AND ON SALES, INDUSTRY MEDIANS. 1961-71
Return on equity
ysm.
All
Industry
Drug
Industry
^ Rar*
1961 8.3 15.8 2d
1962 8.9 16.2 2d
1963 9.1 14.7 2d
1964 10.5 16.3 1st
1965 11.8 18.0 1st
1966 12.7 18.4 1st
1967 11.3 13.0 1st
1968 11.7 17.9 1st
1969 11.3 19.1 1st
1970 9.5 15.5 2d
1971 9.1 15.1 2d
Return on Sales
All
Industry
(oercent)
Drug
Industry
(percent) Rank
4.2 10.5 2d
4.2 10.5 2d
4.4 10.6 1st
5.0 10.8 1st
5.5 10.3 2d
5.6 10.2 2d
5.0 9.6 2d
4.8 9.0 2d
4.6 9.2 2d
3.9 9.3 2d
3.8 9.1 2d
At the core of the pharmaceutical industry are the 131 members of
the PMA, which do most of the industry's advertising, reap most
of the profits and control 95 per cent of the market. They sell
and produce both brand and generic name products, conduct most of
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the industry * s research and control most of the patents. According
to the 1968 drug task force study, the remaining 5 per cent of pres
cription drugs are manufactured "by many hundreds of companies and
are sold by both trademark and generic names... They control few
17
drug patents, do little or no research, compete on the basis of
both quality and price, conduct only minimal promotion of their
products, and achieve relatively low rates of profit/'
The drug industry does not appear to be overly concentrated,
with the top 10 firms controlling a bit over 50 per cent of the
market and the top 20 controlling 70 per cent. But there does
seem to be a pattern of domination by certain companies within a
series of small markets such as antibiotics, hormones or
analgesics. A summary of the Nelson Subcommittee hearings, for
example, noted*
In a group of 20 such markets, the proportion
of output accounted for by the leading five firms
ranged from 56 per cent to 98 per cent. It is within these
markets that decisions on prices are made and given such
concentration ratios, we should not expect individual firms
to disregard their own impact on market parameters. It is
on this basis that market power has been achieved. 47
The Nelson Subcommittee report strongly suggested that this
market power was one cause of the large price variation
among versions of drugs. In some instances, price differentials
were found to be as great as several thousand per cent between
competing products. Following is a list of the various
prices of different versions of two drugs mentioned often
at the Nelson Subcommittee hearings:
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Reserpine,
_ U.S.P. (1.000 0.25mc,. tablets )
American Pharmaceutical -------
Carroll -------- — - - - - -
CIBA (Serpasil) - - -
Columbia Medical ----------
Consolidated Midland --------
Corvit ------- --------
Darby ---------------
Interstate Drug Exchange ------
Kasar ---------------
Lannet.* - -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Lilly (Sandril) ----- - - - -
Modern Medical Supply --------
Parke* Davis (Serfin --------
Penhurst --------------
Pennex --- ------------
Premo ---------------
? Rondex ---------------
Smith Kline & French (Eskaserp) - - -
Stanlabs -------- — - - - -
Supreme --------------
Upjohn (Reserpoid) ---------
West-Ward --------------
Wolins - - -------------
Sodium Secobarbital .
U.S.P, ( 1.000 lOOmo. _cajp.sul_es_L
American Pharmaceutical ------
Carroll -------- -----
Columbia Medical ----- ----
Darby ---------------
Interstate Drug Exchange - - - - -
Kasar ---------- ----
Lannett -------------
Lilly (Seconal) - --------
Modern Medical Supply -------
Pennex --------------
Premo -- ------------
Rondex -- ------------
Supreme - ------------
West-Ward ------ ------
Wolins - ~ ----- ------
$2.60
1.1b
39. 50
1.30
1.9b
2.b0
.59
.60
1.50
2.80
9.12
.58
10.80
1.25
.85
2.40
1.40
46.00
2.50
1.50
22,38
2.00
.59
$12.36
6.25
5.25
4.60
4.75
5.25
6.20
18.30
4.00
4.45
8.10
5.25
6.96
5.85
4.85
**********
The federal controversy over the Maximum Allowable Cost
program — with consumer advocates and legislators opposed by
drug makers and organized medicine — had its antecedents on
the state level.
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Similar contests have been fought in various state
legislatures which have considered generic drug bills to foster
more widespread use of lower cost versions of prescription
drugs
.
The first such bill was introduced in 1967 in the
Massachusetts Legislature, and the ensuing battle between
interests pro and con prefigured the current fight over the
federal MAX program. The struggle to pass and administer the
Massachusetts Generic Drug Law is told in the following two
chapters.
20
CHAPTER II
O.i Aug* 21, 19 70, Senate 1367, known as the generic drug
*
bill, was signed by Massachusetts Gov. Francis W. Sargent. First
of its kind in the nation, the law was an unorthodox attempt to
cut drug costs.
This was to be accomplished through a change in the way
prescriptions were written. The large majority of prescriptions
were for the heavily-advertised brand name version of a drug.
Under the new law, doctors were also required to write on the
prescription the name of the generic version, which usually
could be bought at substantial savings. The patient then could
choose between brand and generic and communicate his preference
to the pharmacist.
It had not been smooth sailing for the generic drug bill.
Quite the contrary. It took three years for a bill to pass the
General Court And the one that passed, $1367, was considerably
different than the original drug bill introduced in 1968 by Rep.
I. Edward Serlin. Where the Mattapan lawmaker’s bill was four-
and-a-half lines, the bill Sargent signed ran to three pages.
The following legislative account of the bill is from House
and Senate records:
After Serlin introduced his bill, H2265 in 1968
it was heard in March by the Social Welfare Committee, of
which he was a member. The committee gave the bill a
* S1367 was officially designated "An Act Establishing A Drug
Formulary Commission in the Department of Public Health and
Requiring Physicians, When Prescribing Drugs By Brand Names, To
Include The Generic of Chemical Names of Such Drugs." Mercifully,
it was shortened in both official and popular usage to "Generic
Drug Law” or "Drug Formulary Law."
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favorable report. It was reworded when it advanced
to the House floor and was redesignated H 4295, passed
to be endorsed and sent to the Senate, The Senate
substituted its own version of the bill, S1109, and
sent it to the House. The House amended it to conform
with the bill it originally sent to the Senate — H4395 —
and sent it back. The Senate did not concur with the
House version and a conference committee was convened
to settle the differences between the branches. The
committee, however, never reported to the Legislature and
no further action was taken that year.
In 1969, several generic drug bills were filed
in addition to Serlin* s. Action on two of the bills
was deferred until the following session by the Social
Welfare Committee. The committee gave Serlin* s bill,
H 421, the favorable report and sent it to the
Senate as H5006. It was reported in a Ways and Means
Committee study order in the Senate and was referred
to the Rules Committee, where it stayed until the
session ended.
Again in 1970, Serlin* s bill, this time H523,
was one of several drug bills before the Social Welfare
Committee. Again Serlin* s bill was the one reported
out favorably and sent to the floor. The House changed
it slightly, passed it and sent it to the Senate as
H5222. The Senate Ways and Means Committee combined
It with another bill and reported out the new version, S1360.
On the floor the Senate rewrote it and redesignated it S1367.
It was sent back and forth between branches for amendments,
but it was finally passed and sent to the governor. He
sent the bill back to the Legislature with a suggested
amendment, which both branches concurred in. Sargent
then signed the bill. ^
The preceding is the official accounting of the law but
does not even hint at the lobbying battle fought over Serlin*
s
bill, and which dictated the terms of S1367. A fuller account
must start with Serlin, a lawyer who was elected to represent
2
the Mattapan section of Boston in 1966.
Serlin* $ motivation in sponsoring the bill was of the sort
that often fuels the engine of representative democracy — a
mixture of altruism and political self-interest.
His district was the once predominant ly-Jewish Mattapan,
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the 14th 'Vard of Boston, 10th Suffolk representative district.
There were still signs of Jewishness evident there —politicians,
for instance, continued to flock to G and G*s Kosher Restaurant
3
on election eve. But increasing numbers of white residents were
moving out of Mattapan as blacks moved in from nearby Roxbury.
The result, one commentator wrote, was ”the most severe example
of blockbusting in Boston ..." 4
The whites who remained behind in Mattapan tended to be
older poorer Jews who had lived there all their lives and who
*
either would not or could not leave. The diminishing white
population and the alwavs-volatile political situation in Mattapan
made the chance of survival slim for a white legislator.
“Berlin was never strong in that district,” Maurice Donahue,
then-Senate president, recalled. "There were always a lot of
opponents. So, if you had a big issue you would be on it and
marry the issue, and the big issue in that district was anything
to do with elderly citizens."
The wedding of Serlin and the generic drug issue, for all
intents and purposes, took place in 1967 at Massachusetts General
Hospital. That was where Serlin, being treated for lung cancer,
first read about the probe of the pharmaceutical industry by
the Subcommittee on AntiTrust and Monopoly, chaired by Sen.
Gaylord Nelson, D-Wisconsin. Statements by Nelson and others
extolling the benefits of widespread use of generics led Serlin
* A book about the whites who stayed, “Jews in a Chancing
Neighborhood! The Study of Mattapan,” written by Iona Ginsburg,
was published in 1975 by the Free Press, New York, N.Y.
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to wonder "why the consumer, especially the elderly consumer,
was spending so much on high-priced drugs, when he could get
low-cost generics."
Once out of the hospital and back in the House, Serlin
1 ~ s - his generic drug bills, .i2265. It stated?
Every registered Massachusetts physician
who prescribes drugs for his patient's shall in
every prescription calling for drugs, use the
generic name in addition to the brand name, if any.
Because the bill was so short, Serlin said, when he brought it to
the House counsel to be checked, "He made fun of it." And Serlin
added, "He didn’t think much of it and didn’t think it would go
anywhere." There were those, however, who were not amused by
the bill.
It would soon become clear that representatives of the
medical community and pharmaceutical industry saw nothing funny
about Serlin* s bill. Indeed, they looked upon it as a threat,
and would lobby mightily to kill it. Serlin* s bill was the first
of what were to be several attempts to alter the brand name
*
prescription drug system. As such, the Serlin bill became
the center of a legislative battle between lobbyists for the
state’s doctors and druggists, and the nation’s brand name
drug makers on one side, and Serlin and consumer interest groups
on the other. That contest, which continues today in the State
* In proposing to give the consumer a voice in the selection
of which version of a drug to buy, Serlin* s bill posed a fundament-
al change in the American Health Care system. As John Cady, a mar-
keting Analyst, and others, pointed out, the distinguishing feature
of that system has been that purchasers of health care services, do
not, by and large, make purchasing decisions. Purchasing decisions
are made almost exclusively by physicians not patients.
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House over amendments to strengthen the Generic Drug Law,
has involved dozens of lobbyists and legislators and cost a
minimum of tens of thousands of dollars. On the federal level,
a similar contest is being conducted and has spilled over into
court — as medical and pharmaceutical groups seek to stop the
federal government from encouraging purchase of the least
expensive versions of drugs under Medicare and Medicaid.
Initially Serlin did not anticipate opposition to his
bill, he said, because of its purpose — to lower the cost
of drugs. But even if he had foreseen the opposition, it is
doubtful the 1 Serlin would have been anxious to enlist support.
He had a reelection campaign in 1970 and the prospect of opponents
to consider. The more supporters he had for his bill, the more
he would have to share the credit when it passed. Further,
Serlin was a loner and was not popular with the legislative
leadership. Serlin, in Senate President Donahue's words,
was H a solo performer rather than a team player.'
Nonetheless, at the start Serlin did a good job of promot-
ing his bill. After filing his bill in 1968, Serlin secured the
endorsement of Republican Gov. John Volpe, through the simple
expedient of writing him a letter. The letter could not have
come at a more opportune time — Volpe was in the middle of
preparing his 1968 state of the state message, when cost cutting
would have been uppermost in his mind. Volpe seized the opportunity
to get behind Serlin* s bill and, in the written reply, told the
representative he was directing state officials to implement
the use of generics wherever possible. " I believe that the
legislation you have filed,” the governor wrote, “is a
25
progressive step.” ^
Serlin also managed to have his bill added to the
Democratic legislative program for 1968, thus securing at
least the nominal support of Senate President Donahue, Speaker
of the House Robert Quinn and state Democratic chairman Lester
Hyman. The appearance of the bill on the program could not
7hurt its chances in a legislature two-thirds Democratic.
Likewise, Serlin endeavored to promote his bill with
legislators and the public t He printed and distributed circulars
comparing the prices paid for certain drugs by brand and generic
name — carefully selected for maximum impact. M I sent it (the
circular) to every radio and TV station," Serlin said. "1 spoke
on many TV shows. 1 don*t think anyone could have lobbied more
for their own bill. Tremendous interest was generated."
Among those whom Serlin* s wave of publicity reached was
Thomas Gallagher, a Boston Herald Traveller columnist who wrote'
on State House affairs and who would prove to be the singlemost
important factor in the eventual passage of the Serlin bill.
During the life of the bill* Gallagher, whose thrice-weekly
column ran on the editorial page, would write nearly a dozen
articles in behalf of the drug bill.
"A Dorchester legislator," he wrote in his first column
on the bill on Jan. 24, 1968, "is convinced that millions can
be slashed from Gov. Volpe’s billion-dollar budget without any
reduction in services to the people.' Referring to the effect
of Serlin* s publicity campaign Gallagher wrote on Feb.
22 that
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the bill was “gathering momentum.” But he wondered prophetically,
just how expensive, or well-financed, a lobbying effort will be
made to kill the Berlin bill ...” 9
Before long, Gallagher would find out — to his dismay.
The lobbying against Serlin’s bill began the moment after it
appeared on the House calendar.
One of those who noted the bill’s appearance was Dr. Robert
Holland, legislative chairman of Massachusetts Medical Society,
which counted about 7,000 of the state ! s approximately 10,000
*
doctors as members. Serlin’s bill was one of hundreds that
Holland leafed through each year. He reduced the mass to a
list of health-related measures for consideration of the MAX
Committee on Legislation, which decided the stand on each.
The stand on Serlin’s bill was negative. “Our opposition to
the bill," Holland explained, “was based on the simple premise
that the doctor certainly should be getting the drug he writes
the prescription for.”
Another who took note of the Serlin bill was Boston Atty.
Robert Sylvester, who had decided to enter the realm of State
House lobbying and was shopping around for a client. "It didn’t
seem right to me," he said, “that a doctor would be interfered
with in prescribing drugs for his patient." Sylvester was one of
* Not even the state knew how many doctors were practicing.
Doctors were required to register with Massachusetts, but were
not required to re-register until 197b. (interview Public Health
Commissioner, William Bicknell, Sept. 1975.)
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several lawyers who became involved in lobbying — for the first
*
and last time — with the generic drug issue. Through contacts
in Washington, Sylvester was put in touch with Merck, Sharpe and
Dohme, one of the nation’s leading drug makers. Sylvester had
worked in Washington in the years after World War II, on the
staff of the Senate Labor Committee, whose subcommittee on health
was in 1974-76 attempting to clear the way for rules encouraging
use of generics in Medicaid and Medicare.
Merck’s position on the drug bill, according to Edward
Carroll, director of economic research, ’’was that a doctor should
be able to specify what he wanted for his patients.” Carroll,
who hired Sylvester, said "only the doctor knows enough” and
"the bill usurped his prerogative.’ Carroll said Merck also
objected "because of the varieties in action among some brand
and generic drugs.”
Sylvester said, "In a way it (the opposition to the Serlin
bill) was a fairly selfish attitude to take,” because Merck had
a financial interest in the continued supremacy of brand name
drugs. But, he added, "Doctors are our best customers - we did
not want them to be interferred with."
To assist in the lobbying, Sylvester arranged for Merck to
retain Boston Attorney Paul Burns. For Burns, it was also the
* UMass. political science Prof. Harvey Friedman, a veteran
observer of Boston politics, and a lawyer, says Boston lawyers
take a fling at lobbying and quickly become disenchanted because
it's unlike "the legal work they’re trained for.
‘
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first — anc last — try at State House lobbying. The Pharma-
ceutical Manufacturers Association, trade organization for the
nation’s 131 largest drug makers, retained a third lawyer-newcomer
to lobby against the Serlin bill - Robert Gallagher of Worcester.
Gallagher, like Sylvester, said he was hired through a contact
in Washington, M a lawyer who I was in the Air Force with who knew
1 was practicing in Massachusetts. 1 ’ Gallagher represented the
PMA in 1968 and 1969. The following year Boston Atty. Frank McGee
represented the PNA in lobbying against the Serlin bill. McGee,
unlike the other Boston lawyers, had worked previously for the
PMA and for Smith, Kline and French, a leading drug maker.
There was one lobbyist who needed no introduction to Beacon
Hill. Atty. Charles Dunn, a State House lobbyist for 30 years,
represented the MMS and counted many a powerful legislator as
friend. He would become a leader in the fight against the
Serlin bill. Other key lobbyists included Attys. John Zamparelli
and David Berman and Len permit, all of the Massachusetts
Pharmaceutical Society, representing the state’s pharmacists.
Armed by their employers with facts and figures, this
group of newcomers and veterans had a substantial impact on the
Legislature, George Denmark, a pharmacist and then chairman of
the Board of Trustees of the American Pharmaceutical Association,
who supported generic drug bills, recalled!
The first thing they did was raise the question
of the bogey man that all drugs are not equal. They
created those questions in the minds of legislators.
The companies had tremendous resources to barrage
legislators with all sorts of information. And there
didn’t seem to be anyone to respond to the questions
raised or to refute them.
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There was no evidence of advanced planning or coordination
among the lobbyists in their fight against the Serlin bill.
Instead there was considerable duplication of effort, no
doubt the intended effect. Still, certain lobbyists by lature
and aptutude, concentrated on certain styles of lobbying.
'’Most lobbyists," Associated Press Reporter David Rosen
observed in a 1976 series, "report few entertainment expenses.
Most appear to spend their time testifying at hearings, working
with committee staffs, buttonholing legislators in hallways
and meeting with legislative leaders." For the most part,
lobbying against the Serlin bill closely followed this pattern.
Merck's Carroll seems to have done about the only socialising
with legislators, on two trips he made from the firm's Westpoint,
Pa. headquarters to Boston in 1969. There is one other addition
to Rosen's description in the list of lobbying tactics below,
the first*
1) GRASSROOTS LOBBYING * Laymen respect doctors, and
the Massachusetts Medical Society made ample use of the aura of
expertise of the physician. Many a senator and representative
recalled being contacted by a doctor — or druggist — from
his district and warned about the wound that the Serlin bill
would inflict upon the practice of medicine. Sometimes the
doctor in question was the legislator's personal physician.
MMS lobbyists Dunn and Holland, who was in charge of urging
MMS members to contact their legislators, agreed that the tactic
is standard practice for the organization. Likewise, lermit
urged druggist-members of the pharmaceutical society to contact
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their legislators. The strongest lobby you can get,” Senate
President Donahue observed, "is the family doctor. The personal
relationship i$ very significant."
2) LOBBYING LEGISLATOR S t The leading practitioner of this
type of lobbying was Dunn, well known and well liked by legislators,
including some very influential ones. Donahue called Dunn "one
of the most respected and honest lobbyists in the state's history,"
Sen. Beryl Cohen, D-Suf folk-Norfolk, and chairman of the Social
Welfare Committee, said "He (Dunn) was very close to the Senate
president," knew other legislative leaders and "did (lobbying)
work on a personal basis." Dunn said he was "hitting everyone
I could," and added, "That was my job, contacting reps, speaking
to the leadership." Other lobbyists were friendly with lawmakers.
And At+y. Zemparelli, who represented the pharmaceutical society,
was the nephew of Rep. George Sacco, vice chairman of the
powerful House Ways and Means Committee.
3) COMMITTEE LOBBYING : The routine work of lobbying is
testimony before legislative committees — the Social Welfare
and Ways and Means Committees in the case of the drug bill — and
conferring with and assisting legislative staffs in drafting
bills. Most of the lobbyists fighting against the Berlin bill
engaged in this type of lobbying at one time or another. Some-
times, the types of lobbying were combined as when, for example,
Dunn conferred in the hallway with legislators over wording of a
bill while inside the committee room, Holland testified on the
bill.
So intense was the lobbying against the Serlin bill that
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doctor, druggist, lawyer- lobbyist or all three could have spoken
to the same legislator about the Serlin bill.
Now the stage is set for Serlin* s bill, H2665, which made
its debut at a hearing before the Social Welfare Committee at
10 a.m. on March 26, 1968. Massachusetts uses a joint committee
system, avoiding the waste of time involved in double hearings and
separate House and Senate committee considerations of each bill.
1
The joint standing committees, such as the Social Welfare Committee,
carry out the main burden of hearing and recommending action on
proposed legislation. Every joint committee has six senators
and fifteen representatives and the committee* s judgment is
virtually the final word. More than 90 per cent of joint committee
13
reports are accepted by the Legislature.
At least one member of the Social Welfare Committee was
100 per cent behind the generic bill. Serlin* s membership on
the committee, in fact, turned out to be a most fortunate
coincidence for his bill. Serlin saw no allies in the audience
during the hearing, only opposing lobbyists. But Serlin*
s
presence on the committee provided him with a tactical advantage
that offset what he lacked in allies.
* Unfortunately, the cost of this undertaking cannot be pre-
cisely determined but must be estimated based on present reported
lobbying expenditures, which was not made a requirement until
1974. In 1975, two medical groups, four retail drug firms, the
Massachusetts Medical Society and pharmaceutical association spent
some $32,000 for lobbying on health related legislation. About
$8,000 was spent by the MMS. About $13,000 was spent by the
pharmaceutical association, whose lobbyist was George Sacco, Ways
and Means Committee vice chairman when the Serlin bill was in
the Legislature.
It should not seem surprising to find the pharmaceutical asso-
ciation outspending the MMS. "The pharmaceutical society was
strong, stronger than the medical society," according to former
Senate President Donahue. He agreed that the amount spent on
lobbying in the* years the Serlin bill was in the Legislature
would have exceeded the $32,000 figure.
(Source of the lobbying figures is a report filed in January, 1976,
by State House News Service reporter John Mello from Boston. )
32
A committee member sympathetic to a bill, according to
David Truman in The Gove romental Proce s
$
. can "do much through
his questioning to emphasize (his) views." In the same fashion,
a committee member "hostile" to a viewpoint in testimony "may
obscure the point by interruptions and obstrusive arguments." 14
Serlin may not have read Truman, but he knew instinctively to
press his advantage* I was able to cross-examine every lobbyist...
If I wasn’t on the committee there would have been no one with
enough knowledge to refute the lobbyists’ arguments."
The House chairman of the Social Welfare Committee was
one of the Legislatures two druggists, Rep. Arnold Epstein,
D-Brighton. "I had nothing against generic drugs," he said.
But to avoid the appearance of conflict of interest — he owned
a drug store . e refrained from voting on the bill. Instead,
Epstein played the part of consultant advising fellow committee
members on technical questions about drugs. However, both
Serlin and Senate Committee Chairman Beryl Cohen agreed that
Epstein later voted against the drug bill on the House floor.
Chairman Cohen, a liberal Democrat, supported the concept
behind the Serlin bill, but "may not have been that hot for it,"
as Donahue noted. Later, Cohen declined the traditional task of
a Senate committee chairman, of speaking for a House member’s
bill on the Senate floor.
The bill received a favorable report from the Social
Welfare Committee, despite the lobbyists’ opposition. "A com-
mittee almost always acts favorably on a member’s bill,"
Epstein said.
33
Serlin * s bill was sent to the House floor and read on
lb
April 29. Serlin spoke for it. He was opposed by only a few
represents! Ives, who made objections to the bill on the grounds
that it interfered with a doctor’s professional judgment. However,
Serlin said, he easily turned aside their objections by stressing
the savings in drugs costs his bill could effect. After the
welfare committee hearing, Serlin had expected more opposition
than he encountered on the House floor. Soon it would become
evident that the lobbyists were concentrating their efforts on
the 40-member Senate instead of the 240-member House. In the
meantime, Serlin’ s bill passed the House easily.
Given the Social Welfare Committee report, the debate in
the House may have been moot. Legislative debates often are.
Debates, Truman wrote, "are frequently ridiculed as meaningless...
it is rare that any speech ... changes a vote on a basic issue.”
In debate, Donahue said, "you’re on the floor talking for the
constituency outside." He agreed with Truman’s assessments
"You very rarely change minds in debates on the floor. By the
time of the debate, the battle lines have been drawn. The
lobbying has been done beforehand on both sides.
The battle lines in the case of Serlin* s bill had been
drawn across the entranceway to the Senate chambers. On May 1,
the bill crossed the line as 4395, a slightly rewritten version
17
of Serlin* s bill, changed on the House floor. The ensuing
debate in the Senate over the bill seems to have been an exception
to the Truman-Donahue axiom about the irrelevancy of floor debates.
The reason for this was Sen. Philip Ryan, D-Springf ield,
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the Legislature's other pharmacist. Unlike his House counterpart
Epstein, Ryan did not fear conflict of interest and, in fact,
felt it was his responsibility to speak out against the Serlin
bill. He called it "an attempt by the Legislature to impose
its will on the professional judgment of the medical profession.”
To speak for his bill, Serlin settled for the senator
from his district, Samuel Harmon. An obliging, non-combative
18fellow, Harmon knew next to nothing about generic drugs.
So Serlin sat next to him during the debates in the Senate,
whispering advice. Several senators recalled the spectacle of
Serlin whispering to Harmon in the chambers. It showed why
the brash Serlin was disliked by several lawmakers.
"He was a pain-in-the-ass," Donahue said. "He was not
well-liked at all. His personality and solo-flying hurt early
passage (of hie bill) as much as any other reason. You can't
have a guy from the other chamber looking over your back.
’
(Ponahue, to his credit, did not let his opinion of Serlin
interfere with his opinion of his bill. He was one of the
senators who consistently voted for it.)
The outcome of the Harmon-Ryan debate was no surprise*
Harmon took a beating. "Everybody jumped on me that first year,"
Harmon recalled. Ryan's warnings had a deep and lasting effect
on several senators and complimented the lobbying that had
obviously been done by lobbyists and individual doctors.
MA few doctors and a (county) medical society were hot
against it (the Serlin bill) in my district, and I relied cn
medical opinion,” said Sen. Steven Davenport, D-Jamaica Plain.
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Likewise, Sen. George Keneally, D-Dorchester, whose district
touches Serlin* s f recalled, "We got tons of mail from various
doctors and associations against the bill. I can remember
going to a medical association meeting where they were all
talking about it."
On May 28, the Senate voted to amend Serlin* s bill with a
provision that put the ball back in the doctor’s court. The
amended bill, S1109, reflected the influence of Ryan and the
doctors. The bill stated that a doctor was to write generic
names on prescriptions only "when in his professional judgment
the generic product is therapeutically equivalent to the brand
name drug prescribed."
^
The amendment touched off a legislative ping-pong game:
— On June 3, the House received the Senate bill and on
a motion by Serlin, struck out the provision inserted by the
Senate, restoring the bill to its original form.
— On June 10, the bill was sent back to the Senate and
Kenneally prevailed upon his fellow senators to refuse to con-
cur with the House deletion.
— On June 18, the House approved Serlin* s motion to insist
on the deletion, and to request a conference committee to smooth
out the differences with the Senate.
— On June 24, the Senate voted to insist on its version of
,
20
the bill and to enter into the conference committee.
For the Senate, three opponents to the Serlin bill,
Kenneally, Davenport, and Ronald MacKenzie, R-Burlington, were
21
named by Donahue to the committee.
For the House, Serlin and legislators from Pittsfield and
Nantucket were named to the committee. its members could nc^
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reach a compromise. *' No further action was taken on the bill
in the 1968 session.
In a post-mortem, columnist Gallagher wrote that Serlin'
s
bill had become H the target of the Massachusetts Medical Society,
the retail druggests association, and the big drug companies.”
Then, he added* “Their well-heeled lobby delivered, and the
bill went to its death in a conference committee ... (called)
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over an emasculating amendment.”
Lobbyist-opponents of the bill had established a beachead
in the Senate for future fights over the Serlin bill. ”We
turned it around in the Senate,” Merck’s Sylvester said. "It
would have passed but there was enough evidence (for us) to rai ?
grave doubts about generics being equivalent and about inter-
fering with physicians.
'
The lobbying over the Serlin bill had its lighter moments.
One lobbyist, for instance, approached Serlin prior to a vote
on his bill and — unaware to whom he was talking — proceeded
to condemn the bill. When Serlin identified himself, "The
lobbyist got red in the face and walked away,” he said.
Serlin was also the target of the most bizarre of the
lobbying ploys.
Following what he said was standard procedure, Dunn deter-
mined the identity of the doctor who treated Serlin for lung
cancer, called him at Massachusetts General Hospital and
"told him ’why the hell don’t you tell this guy Serlin he’s
barking up the wrong tree with his bill.’ And Dunn said,
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"As I recall, he did."
But Columnist Gallagher remembered it in a different
fashion: "They were so desperate to get this bill killed
they were using this guy’s lung cancer to get him to take the
heat off.
Soon after Dunn called the doctor, he opened the Herald
Traveller and found on the editorial page "a Gallagher column
condemning my efforts as the lowest form of lobbying."
"It was a very common form of lobbying," Dunn protested.
"If we knew a representative was being treated by a doctor,
I or others would call the doctor and tell him to set this
guy straight."
Gallagher said, "It was in poor taste ... reprehensible.
But it’s the type of thing they would do in heavy lobbying.
So I blasted this guy in my column."
The hue and cry over Serlin’s bill, moreover, went beyond
the Legislature. As the 1969 session opened, there had arisen
among some legislators the feeling that public sentiment
favored the Berlin bill.
The feeling was prompted by several factors.
Two leading opponents to the Berlin bill. Senators Davenport
and Ryan, would not be returning to the Senate. Both were de-
feated in the fall elections, as had been Rep. Epstein. The
defeats seem to have been attributed in part to their opposition
to the drug bill. Encouraging such an interpretation was
* Several legislators ** Donahue, Epstein and Cohen - agreed .it
was so.
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columnist Gallagher, who wrote on Oct. 9:
...there already are indications of some
reassessments of position by legislators
who voted against this consumer" legislation
during the last session.
Two druggists who helped lead the fight,
against the bill ... were defeated in the
September primary, as was ... Davenport who
supported the crippling amendment which
ultimately led to the bill's rejection.
Donahue explained this change in attitude that was taking place
thuslys "You gotta' go where the votes are. You can't continue
to do nice things for your family doctor or neighborhood
*
druggist.
"
One indicator of this change in attitude was the increase
in generic drug bills filed in the 1969 session. Berlin's was
no longer the only one. Among the others was H2389, filed by
Republican Reps. Winston Healy, of Charlemont and Robert
Aronson of Sharon.
"It's what happens when a bill comes along and people
think it will be popular," is how Healy cheerfully explained
the proliferation of drug bills. ^Legislators will file one
and try to get the credit (if it passes). The fight is always
in committee, over whose name goes on the bill that's reported
As for partisanship, Healy indicated, all bets were being
hedged. "Aronson and I were Republicans and Serlin was a
* One indication of the public pulse as regards prescription
drugs was a poll taken for the Boston Globe by Becker Research
Corp. that was published April 19, 1969. Consumers were asked
to rate the best and worst buys in the marketplace. The worst
-
prescription drugs, followed by auto insurance and ^uto
repairs.
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Democrat. I suppose we wanted our party on record as having
filed such a bill."
Unfortunately for Healy, there was no question about
whose name would be on the bill that emerged from the Social
Welfare Committee with the favorable report. Not with Serlin
sitting on the committee.
The committee held its obligatory hearing on the drug
2bbills on Fet. 18, 1969. The makeup of the audience
reflected a second factor behind the Legislature's changing
attitude towards generics. Present were several backers of
Serlin's bill. It had attracted the support of the liberal
Americans for Democratic Action, Massachusetts Consumers
Council and the Association of Massachusetts Consumers:
Dr. Leo Parnes, affiliated with Harvard University Health
Services and Tufts Medical School, whose wife was ADA legis-
lative chairmanj and Dr. Richard Burack, author of the Hand-
book of Prescription Drugs, which argued in behalf of the
use of generics.
Parnes told the Social Welfare Committee:
While the giant pharmaceutical manufacturers
would like us to believe that brand name drugs
are more potent, safe and effective than generics,
there is nothing inherent in trade name preparations
nor in the companies that produce them that guarantee
such products.
The change in sentiment among legislators was noticed by
some of the lobbyists opposed to the Serlin bill. Merck's
Sylvester was one:
The legislators had to have something. They couldn't
keep going home to their districts not being able to
answer their constitue its when they asked why the generic
drug bill didn't pass. You can't stonewall it with con-
sumer legislation. You can't keep defeating it.
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So the Merck contingent of Sylvester, Burns and Carroll set
about the task of devising a compromise.
This was a formulary, or listing of generic drugs in
common use and therefore considered safe, and their brand name
counterparts. Such a formulary was in use by the Department
of Public 'elfare in Merck’s home state of Pennsylvania, as part
of a program to encourage doctors to voluntarily prescribe the
lowest cost version of a drug for relief recipients. The
Pennsylvania plan had encouraged Sen. Hugh Scott, D-Penn.,
to file a bill in the U.S. Senate to adopt it on a federal
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level. If the formulary provision were added to the Serlin
bill, and if the requirement for doctors to prescribe generics
was dropped, Carroll said, the Merck lobbyists were willing to
drop their opposition.
Burns took the proposed compromise to Sen. Kenneally,
who had led the Senate fight against the Serlin bill. Kenneally
and Burns drafted a bill to create a committee to compile and
publish the list of brand and generic names, to be called the
Massachusetts Drug Formulary. The plan was to combine the
formulary bill with Berlin's bill when it arrived in the Senate
Ways and Means Committee, the fiscal unit in the Legislature
through which virtually all bills affecting finances must pass.
Kenneally saw the formulary as "a compromise ... a way of
* During the first nine months of use, the Penn, ormu 1ary
saved $1 million or cut costs by 15.9 per cent.
(interview, Atty. Robert Sylvester, Febr. 1976.)
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getting the bill passed ... a way that people would know which
generics were equivalent” and a way of getting the Legislature
out of the hole it was in regarding the Serlin bill.
But not all the members of the lobby supported the
formulary compromise. Several lobbyists were still against the
passage of any drug bill, formulary or not. Though Merck stood
behind the compromise, the MiMS, pharmaceutical association and
PMA stood ready, as the year before, to kill any drug bill.
Nor were the supporters of the Serlin bill enamored of
the compromise. This was apparent during a July, 1969 hearing
of the Ways and Means Committee on the Serlin and Kenneally
bills.
Parnes warned the committee that Kenneally’ s bill was ” a
delaying tactic" and noted that there were several "high quality"
formularies in print. "I hope your committee," Parnes said, "can
vote favorably (on Serlin’ s bill) without the crippling amend-
ment."
Opposed by elements of both sides in the generic drug
dispute, the formulary compromise failed and so, for the second
straight year, did Serlin* s bill. It was reported out in a
Senate Ways and Means Committee study and then was sent to the
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Rules Committee for the remainder of the 1969 session.
That was the last session in which Merck participated.
"In 1970," Sylvester said, "we didn’t want to get involved."
Carroll suggested that his firm had despaired of passing a
workable generic bill. Nevertheless, lobbyists ior the medj.cul
society, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and Massachusetts ru. s
remained in the State House to fight the 1970 version of Serlin’
s
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bill. "We were active as hell in 1970," Zamparelli of the
Massachusetts Pharmaceutical Association said.
The ADA also filed a generic drug bill and this reflected
a split between it and S©rlin. Indeed, Dr. Burack and Atty.
Nate Pavin of the Massachusetts Association of Consumers, as
well as Dr. and Mrs. Parnes were dissatisfied with Serlin and
his bill. Pavin said they wished to "get a stronger law
through. H At first, they tried to talk Serlin into strengthening
his bill by shifting to the pharmacist the responsibility to pro-
vide tne customer with the choice between drug versions. Pavin
said*
We wanted a much stronger law, possibly one
which said the generic druq would be prescribed
(dispensed by the druggist) unless the doctor
said otherwise.
We tried to talk to Serlin but you couldn’t
talk to him.
So the ADA filed its own bill which, compared to Serlin’ s bill,
was simultaneously stronger and weaker. The ADA measure, H2037,
required that drugs be prescribed by generic name, but left to
the discretion of the physician whether to follow it. It
stated:
Any preparation prescribed by a physician
for which a generic name exists shall be pre-
scribed by its generic name. A brand name may
be added to such prescription and shall be
supplied by the dispensing pharmacist when in
the discretiopq of the prescribing physician it
is required. 29
Of course, the bill had little chance of passage or
even of receiving a favorable report from the Social Welfare
Committee, with Serlin sitting on it. Rather, the ADA bill
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is significant, if at all, for the effect it had on Serlin.
With his bill in the hopper for the third time, he could not
have been very happy to learn that a rival bill was being
backed by representatives of several consumer-oriented organi-
zations. This apparently made Serlin anxious about his bill
and put him in a frame of mine to accept a compromise if it
*
would ensure passage of his bill. Thus Serlin, who had
villified drug company lobbyists at the 1968 committee hear-
ing on his bill and who, Parnes said, "was so anti-drug industry
that it made it difficult for a bill to pass," subsequently
agreed to the formulary compromise which Kenneally had intro-
*
duced in 1969, and perhaps made other concessions.
As if to increase Serlin* s anxiety and solidify his
resolve to compromise, Parnes introduced into the Social Welfare
Committee hearing on the drug bills on March 14, 1970, a
petition in support of the ADA bill signed by 14 Boston area
30
doctors. Nonetheless, professional courtesy, legislative-
style, again prevailed. $ rlin’s bill, H524, received the
favorable report from the committee. The bill was reworded on
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the House floor and sent to the Senate as H5222
Meanwhile, Sen. Ronald MacKenzie, R-Burli.ngton, received
a report from a committee of constituents he had convened to
study the generic drug problem. A member of the conference
* Dr. Joseph Harris, an oral surgeon and investigator with
the state Attorney General* s office, said that Serlin told
him that "sanctions were left out of the. (final) bill. as part
of a compromise." Harris, in his investigative capacity,
checked on compliance of doctors with the law. (Interview,
May, 1976)
44
committee that negotiated over the Serlin bill in vain in 1968,
MacKenzie said he often forms constituent committees to study
complex problems because of the large number of professionals
in his district. The committee on the drug issue, whose members
included a doctor, a druggist a lawyer and an engineer,
recommended a compromise similar to Kenneally’s 1969 formulary
bill.
MacKenzie, who said he favored the concept behind the
Serlin bill, but thought it was ,j too simple to be safe,” there-
upon joined Kenneally in refiling his formulary bill. But
before they introduced the bill, MacKenzie said, they determined
that “Serlin would buy the idea."
The Kenneally-MacKenzie bill, S927, was sent to Senate
Ways and Means with other drug-related measures, Serlin’ s bill
32
included. On April 8
,
1970, the committee reported out
S1360, a combination of the Serlin and Kenneally-MacKenzie bills.
But the bill included a sentence not present in either of its
predecessors
s
Drugs which are the subject matter of rights
issued by the United States Patent Office and the U.S.
Trade Mark Bureau are exempt from the provisions
33
of this chapter.
No one interviewed for this paper could pinpoint the source of
the sentence but there are strong indications it was inserted
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on behalf of the lobbyists for the drug makers. Pavin, for
instance, recalled attempting to persuade Serlin to strike the
sentence from his bill. However, Pavin said, "Serlin was
uptight and there was some kind of deal with some of the key
legislators and lobbyists to exclude patent rights in the bill."
S 1360 was sent by Ways and Means to the Committee on Bills
34in the Third Reading, which rewrote the bill. The sentence
on patent rights was taken from the end of the bill and put in
the middle of the new bill in slightly different form. It now
read:
The source for (the formulary) ... shall not
include drugs which are the subject matter of rights
issued by the United States Patent Office or con-
tained under tjre laws relating to trade names and
trade marks.
The Senate passed S1367 and sent it to the House, which referred
36
it to Vtfays and Means. On June 4, Committee Vice Chairman
George Sacco proposed an amendment to S1367, striking out the
'•'hrase "or obtained under the laws relating to trade names and
37
trade marks," from the sentence on patent rights. " Sacco,
an attorney and de facto chairman of the committee, could not
recall the purpose or reason for the amendment. He said, as
committee vice chairman, he would receive ’clarifying amendments
* Many of those involved with the drug bill suspect that was
the source. Connie Williams, Mrs. Parnes’ successor at the ADA,
says the sentence in question "appears in almost every bill in
every state. The wording is exactly the same. It’s too much
of a coincidence." That view would confirm Mrs. Parnes*
estimation of the drug company lobbyists * tactics’: ihe danger
was present at all times. Some people didn’t understand it, but
we had to keep guarding against lobbyists who would try and
interject their kind of language in redrafting the bill. They
would try to change language or use stalling tactics or
parliamentary maneuvers. Primarily, I think it was in the Senate.
Permit of the pharmaceutical society suggests the sentence
might have originated with the PMA, which would have had an inter-
est in projecting patent rights.''
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for certain bills from House counsel and I would introduce
them." Or perhaps, he suggested, the amendment "may have been a
compromise measure. Sometimes we did things we didn’t really
38like to do to get it passed."
If the latter was the reason for the amendment, Sacco
would have been the logical choice to introduce it. His
nephew, Zamparelli, was one of two lobbyists for the Mass.
Pharmaceutical Association, one of the chief foes of the original
Serlin bill. In fact, Sacco himself went to work as a
lobbyist for the association after he left the Legislature and
ran unsuccessfully in 1974 for attorney general.
Sacco's amendment was adopted by Ways and Means and
S1367 was enacted by both branches and sent to the governor.
But his staff, apparently wary of any signs that the bill had
been tampered with by opposing lobbyists, advised him to send
it back to the Legislature with a suggested change. He did
so and included the following explanation:
I recognize that to return the bill at this
late date creates the danger that attempts will
be made by vested interests to scuttle it during
prorogation. I do not want this to happen. How-
ever, since the bill on my desk may be no bill
at all, I feel that returning it is the only
right course . .
.
The bill, as written, has a major defect
which could nullify its effect. During the course
of its passage, a provision was inserted which
excludes from the list of drugs that may be listed
in the formulary as therapeutically equivalent
"drugs which are the subject matter of rights
issued by the United States Patent Office."
Nearly every drug, patented or not, has a trademark.
Under federal law names of drugs are registered in
the United States Patent Office and rights are
granted for use of those names.
It is the opinion of those who have examined
S1367 that the bill will be interpreted as exclud-
ing from the formulary any drug whose name is
with the patent office for trademark
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Sargent* s amendment was to insert the word "patent” to precede
and clarify the word "rights." Both House and Senate adopted
the amendment and Sargent signed the bill on Aug. 21.
;
***********
One reason the Serlin bill passed was offered by Senate
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Burke. "The bill had been
around for a long time. Many bills are introduced and only
pass after they are filed for several sessions."
This suggests that the generic drug bill ran the legisla-
tive gamut in a manner similar to British "private member" bills.
Scores of such bills are introduced in Parliament at the
end of each session and they often deal with "far-sighted
proposals," according to one commentator. But, he noted, most
such bills "rarely got much further than the second reading.'.'
After a private member bill is introduced several times — as
was the case with Serlin 1 s bill — it "may be passed" or
incorporated into the platform of one of Britain’s parties.
A proposal for daylight savings, for example, figured in a
private member’s bill for eight years before the government
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adopted it.
The passage of the drug bill, however, did not mean the end
of the lobbying against it. Lobbyists managed to have a $67,000
appropriation for printing and distributing the formularies
deleted from the Department of Public Health budget in July,
1971. Dr. Burack, who became chairman of the Formulary Commission,
wrote in a letter to the governor urging that the appropriation
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be restored. ’’The fine hand of the pharmaceutical interests was
all too evident at the conference committee on the budget.”
Likewise, the lobbyists branched out into the public health
department, which was given partial responsibility for the law.
It was only logical that the lobbyists would move into the
department, for, as Truman noted, administration of a law
”is, quite properly, an extension of the legislative process.”
The law, its reception in the health department and attempts
to amend it in the Legislature are the concerns of the next
chapter.
CHAPTER III
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The Massachusetts Generic Drug Law was, in the words of
former Public Health Commissioner William Bicknell, "a typical
Massachusetts law, lovely, liberal, loosely-worded, ineptly
thought out and poorly written.”
This was no accident. It was the result of compromise
which ended several years of conflict between lobbyists for
and against the bill with legislators in the middle. Under
such circumstances, murky language may be the price of passage.
David Truman has observed:
Where compromise in the legislative stage is the
alternative to temporary failure and where the imperative
to compromise is adopted by some participants as a means
of avoiding the open frustration of expectations widely
held in the community, the terms of legislative settlement
are almost bound to be ambiguous.
And so it was with the Generic Drug Law, a 55-line piece
of legislation that was a dozen times as long and almost that
much cloudier than the original drug bill filed in 1968 by
State Rep. I. Edward Serlin, D-Mattapan.
Berlins aim was to cut prescription drug costs. The
bill required doctors when writing prescriptions for brand
name drugs also sold by generic name to include the name of
the generic version. Generics generally were sold at much lower
prices. Serlin wanted the choice between generic and brand name
version — until then in the sole provenance of the physician —
to be left up to the consumer, the person paying for the
prescription.
If consumers chose the generic version, Serlin estimated,
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total savings could be in the millions. But few Massachusetts
laymen knew what the term “generic drug" meant, much less that
it could mean lower prescription prices. Few, therefore, would
have cared to know that Serlin' s bill was twice killed by
lobbyists for the state's doctors and druggists and the nation’s
drug makers. As Berlin spread the word that his bill would
lower drug costs, however, and, coincidentally, as consumer
consciousness arose, lawmakers felt that public sentiment was
mushrooming in behalf of the Serlin bill.
By the 1970 session, lawmakers decided there was sufficient
compulsion to warrant passage of a generic bill. But what they
passed resembled Berlin's bill only slightly.
Several key senators — who had been among those blocking
passage of Serlin* s bill — supported a compromise to meet the
objections of doctors, druggists and drug makers that some
generics were inferior to brand name counterparts and thus could
not be used interchangeably. The lawmakers combined Berlin's
bill with another for a commission to compile a list of generic
and brand name counterparts — a formulary — as a guide for
doctors writing prescriptions. The new bill passed both houses
and was signed into law on Aug. 21, 1970 by Gov. Francis W.
Sargent.
Where Serlin* s bill had simply required doctors to
prescribe generically, the new law included that requirement
as if in afterthought. Indeed, 51 of the 55 lines dealt
primarily with the terms of the compromise — the formulary.
moreover, several loopholes in the law. i oiThere were.
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instance, it directed that a physician "shall” include the
generic name of a drug on a prescription but failed to include
a sanction if the physician did not. Later, the Formulary
Commission drafted a position paper stating, in effect, that
"shall" really meant "should" thus allowing doctors to decide
whether to prescribe by brand name only. Thus, by adminis-
trative fiat, the law was watered down to allow doctors to
flout it at will.
Further, the law ignored the realities of medical practices*
Time and the hectic pace of the doctor’s workday were not on
the side of the law. It assumed a broad knowledge of
pharmaceutics by the average doctor. Most doctors had not
studied pharmacology since medical school and had not kept
3
pace with new drug developments. Many were unfamiliar with
the long, hard-to-remember generic names of some drugs and
find it tiresome to consult the formulary whenever they wrote
**
prescriptions. Brand names, on the other hand, were devised
to be shorter, easier to remember, and therefore easier to
prescribe.
Nevertheless, such ambiguities and complexities, according
* This interpretation was indicated by Andra Hotchkiss,
deputy general counsel of the Department of Public Health, in
a letter dated Nov. 20, 1973.
m In a test taken last year, of how much doctors know about
prescribing antibiotics, half the 4,513 physicians around the
country who voluntarily took the 50-question multiple-choice
test achieved scores of "only 68 per cent or worse," according
to The New York Times. Doctors who had been out of medical
School longest tended to do worst on the test. News Item,
Doctors’ Scores Low in Test on Use of Antibiotics , NYT dec. 18,
1975, p. 28.
52
to Truman, can be "at the very heart of a successful political
formula, especially where the necessity for compromise (in the
Legislature) is recognized but is difficult to achieve in
explicit terms.” The ambiguity "postpones” the necessity for
a showdown between the competing interests clashing over the
5
apparent irreconcilable differences in the original bill.
For the formula to be successful, however, there must
be "administrators willing to resolve the difficulties that
were too thorny for the Legislature to solve." Massachusetts
administrators wanted no part of the difficulties in implementing
the drug law. Furthermore, the Legislature, having passed it,
would not appropriate funds to administer the law properly.
There could be only one outcome, failure of the law.
Surveys on its impact after it went into effect in early
1972, confirm the prognosis — doctors, who had no reason to
believe they would be penalized for not obeying the law, did
not obey it. Most consumers, unaware of the benefits or even
the existence of the law — owing to the failure of the state to
promote it — continued to pay prices for brand name drugs exceed-
ing the cost of generic counterparts.
All of this was in the future when, on Dec. 21, 197;., Gov.
Sargent announced his appointments to the Formulary Commission.
Sounding a note of optimism, he declared:
Passage of the generic drug bill signalled a new
era for the Massachusetts consumer. The members I am
appointing today will see to it that the bill is
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implemented effectively, I shall continue to pursue
whatever measures are necessary to assure that the
prescribed drugs needed by the citizens of
Massachusetts are available at reasonable costs.
The commissioners were all prestigious members of the
medical and allied professions.
Named chairman was Dr. Richard Burack, author of "The
Handbook of Prescription Drugs," advisor to the Massachusetts
Consumers Council and long an advocate of generic prescribing
and supporter of the Serlin bill. He was described in a press
release from the governor’s office as "a nationally known
authority on drugs,
*
Appointed alternate chairman was another early supporter
of the Serlin bill. Dr. Leo Parnes, affiliated with Tufts
Medical Center and Harvard University Health Services, who
had assisted his wife, who represented Americans for Democratic
Action, in lobbying for passage of a drug bill.
Other members were*
George Denmark, a pharmacist and chairman of the Board
of Trustees of the American Pharmaceutical Association, which
represents a third of the nation’s pharmacists. (Denmark also
had supported a generic drug bill.
}
Dr. Arthur Hadler, chief of medical services at the
outpatient clinic, Boston Veteran’s Administration Hospital.
Ms. Juanita Long, dean of Northeastern University School
6
of Nursing.
Among those attending the swearing-in ceremony was the
Commissioner of Public Health, Dr. Alfred K. Frechette. His
department was to be the commission’s administrative base,
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specified in the law. The commission was charged with
"effectively implementing" the law, as Sargent had pointed out, but it
was part-time and unpaid. Still its members were ready and anxious
to get to work after they were sworn in. Frechette, one commission-
er recalled, was reluctant*
He wanted to postpone the meeting. I can f t recall
why. But he wanted to sort of put the whole thing off.
We said absolutely not, we wanted to have our first
meeting. He said that was fine but I got the impression
that he was in favor, now that we were sworn in, of
forgetting the whole thing.
There were many reasons behind Frechette's reluctance.
After a dozen years as public health commissioner, Frechette
displayed the cautious and conservative traits of the long-time
civil servant, as many of his co-workers testified.
"His whole method of operation was not to antagonize any-
one in the Legislature or medical community," Edward Lichtenstein,
a department worker and the Formulary Commission's first adminis-
trator, said. "He didn't like to step on people's toes."
* The commissioner refused to allow his name to be used.
** Frechette, who now serves as chairman of the Cancer Coopera-
tive Board, a private group, was appraised thusly by Springfield
Daily News Editor Richard Garvey, a board memberi "If I were to
grade him for effectiveness of leadership, I'd give him no more than
a 'C.* He allows the group to spend considerable time on trivia.
He oftentimes is not up to date on matters, and so must consult
with staff at meetings instead of prior thereto. He frequently
does not make certain that staff has fairly adequately explored
alternatives before asking the board members for a policy decision.
He may have some special problems with the co-op because a few of
the doctors on the policy board are highly respected professionals
but it appears to roe that it is Doctor Frechette* s limited ability
to lead rather than his lack of ability that restricts his
effectiveness as chairman."
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Frechette could hardly have relished the prospect of forcing
the law on a resentful medical establishment. Nor was he alone
in that reluctance in the department — described as ‘‘doctor-
oriented” by Serlin. “A lot of prople (in the department) were
embarrassed by it (the law),” Lichtenstein added.
Frechette’s cautious attitude was reinforced by other
factors, classic sources of bureaucratic inertia, stacking up
against the law.
The department had played no part in originating the law,
was not identified with its passage and so had no real stake
in its success. If it had, the attitude of the department staff
might have been different. Initiation of a law, Truman has
observed, ” implies a commitment to a particular line of policy”
7
and there was no such commitment towards the drug law.
Peter Hiam, department hearings officer and later its
counsel, agreed "It would have been low priority because the
department hadn’t filed the bill, . .” Likewise, Serlin said
"some people in the commissioner’s office told me it would have
been better if the department had had a hand in sponsoring the
law.
"
If the fact that the department had not been involved in
its origin hurt the law’s chances, the Legislature’s tight-
fistedness killed them. It was common enough for the Legislature
to pass a bill and then fail to appropriate funds for it. ‘The
Legislature passes all sorts of bills but doesn’t give the
administering department the funds," Richard Fleming, legislative
counsel for the health department, said. Commissioner ' rechette
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added, “In state government, nothing is easy. You don’t get
appropriations. You don't get the money you need.”
In the case of the drug law, the Legislature could afford
to be cavalier. There were no influential interest groups
lobbying for the funds. Though consumerism was on the upswing,
it would be a while before the appearance of consumer groups
with sufficient clout to make the lawmakers think twice before
*
refusing to fund a bill like Serlin* s.
There was of course one legislator who wished for the law
to succeed. But Serlin had no clout with the legislative
leadership or fellow lawmakers. Even an outsider like Lichtenstein
knew Serlin “wasn't popular with the leadership.” His fellow
legislators may have had to pass his bill because they could ill
afford to kill it. But funding it when there was no pressure
to was another story.
Frechette, moreover, was unwilling to divert funds from
existing programs for a program to educate the public about the
law. "It. (the drug law) was one of 100 separate programs I
administered," he said.
Yet, despite lack of funds and apparent hostility to the
law in the department, there still existed a slim chance for its
success. The department’s Food and Drug Division employed 11
* Maurice Donahue, Senate president when the Serlin bill was
introduced, and Duane Lochard, in New England State Politics,
agree that Americans for Democratic Action, though vocal and
long active in the Legislature, had little power for impact.
Its impact would be strengthened when it allied with newer
consumer groups such as Mass. Pirg in the lat •
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inspectors whose duties included monitoring pharmacies. Division
Director George Michael pointed out that those inspectors could
have been used to monitor prescriptions to determine if they
were written according to law, and if they were not, to encourage
pharmacists to urge doctors to follow the law.
But Frechette did not give the Food and Drug Division
responsibility for the law. In the manner of bureaucracies,
where personality can supersede program, Frechette and Michael,
a chemist and 25-year veteran of the department, were perpetually
at odds.
"Frechette always had a feud going with Michael and he
wasn’t going to give him any new responsibilities,” Lichtenstein
said. Hiam offered a similar though stronger appraisal* ”He
(Frechette) couldn’t stand him."
Michael, for his part, wanted the law assigned to his
division and says he favored it. "They didn’t give it (the
law) to me because I’m an unmitigated bastard. I would have
enforced it.,"
There are many who agree with Michael’s self-estimate.
Harvey Friedman, a University of Massachusetts political science
professor and long-time observer of Boston politics, said,
"Michael’s a wheeler-dealer.” Associated Press reporter Steve Cohen,
who covers the State House, said Michael has political enemies who
"tried to get rid of him several times (from the department) and I
don’t know what keeps him there." Lucy Farmer, a public health
department staff member, said, "Commissioners from Frechette oa
back had trouble with George and were wary of him and his
political connections.”
b&
The record shows that in 1966 Michael was indicted on
four charges of illegally selling and transporting alcoholic
beverages. Frechette said the charges were politically inspired. At
any rate they were never prosecuted. Other charges, of improperly
inspecting chickens were considered but never lodged against
Michael, according to Frechette.
Moreover, there were some questions about whether Michael
would have enforced the drug law. "It's natural that Michael
would have wanted to torpedo the law," according to Legislative
Cousel Fleming. "He’s a friend of those he’s supposed to regulate.”
Farmer said* "George is a nice guy but people are afraid of him.
He’s aligned with what you might call some conservative-minded
people.”
In retrospect, however, even Frechette agreed that Food and
Drug would have been the logical place to put the law. "That’s
a good question, " Frechette replied when asked why Food and Drug
was not so selected. "They do have inspectors and it would be
ideal to check implementation of the law/' Frechette said it was
Dr. Burack, chairman of the Formulary Commission, "who didn’t want
it (the law) to get buried in Food and Drug.”
Burack, according to Frechette, "wanted to run" the adminis-
tration of the law. Frechette, in this event, still had the
commissioner’s prerogative to choose a division in which to put
the law. It stated that the commission would be in "the Depart-
ment of Public Health,” and no more. Thus, at least implicitly,
* Despite several letters from the author requesting an
interview, Burack, who now practices medicine in Indiana, did
not respond.
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as commissioner, Frechette would have taken over from there.
The law was assigned to the fAedical Care Division, headed by
Dr. Ann Pettigrew
,
and was responsible for monitoring medical
care facilities such as nursing homes and hospitals, and who
got along with Frechette, according to Hiam and Farmer.
The key policy decisions, however, were left to the
commission. It made its most fateful in mid-1971, when the
formulary was being compiled. The commission drafted for inclusion
in the formulary booklet a position paper entitled “The Role of the
Physician in the Implementation of the Massachusetts Drug -
Formulary. Therein, the commission allowed, the physician
could write " no substitute” for the brand name called for on a
prescription if, in his judgment, it was appropriate. Though
the corranission also stressed its hope that physicians would not
"use this alternative method indiscriminately,” that is just what
happened. The interpretation was tantamount to giving physicians —
most of whom were indifferent or hostile to the law — license to
ignore it.
When Serlin heard of the commission’s interpretation, he
confronted the members he felt were responsible, Burack and
Parnes. M I told them ’no substitution’ wasn't in the law and what
they were writing was their interpretation. I warned them I would
stop them." Serlin later reconsidered because a fight with the
* State Sen. Beryl Cohen, who was chairman of the Public Health
Committee when it considered Serlin* s bill, said " ihe Department of
Public Health would determine where it (the Serlin law) would be
administered," and called Michael "politically controversial...
There were efforts to keep things from him. .
.
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commission ''would only kill the chances for the law." To this
day, Serlin believes the commission’s interpretation severely
undermined the law.
Like Serlin, lobbyists for the doctors, druggists and drug
*
makers were watching the development of the law. "The same
crew that worked it in the legislature didn’t stop when it
passed a half dead bill," according to Sen. Beryl Cohen,
D-Norfolk-Suffoik, chairman of the Social Welfare Committee when
it considered the Serlin bills. "They (the lobbyists) were in
for the whole thing. That crew could have worked easier in the
Executive Department (in public health) than in the Legislature
anyway. They could have exerted more influence." The lobbyists
certainly made their presence felt. Each of three administrators
to the Formulary Commission received repeated visits from lobbyists
asking about the progress of the formulary and what drugs it
woulo and would not include. Lichtenstein tells of one visit*
They'd drop around once in a while. They have
different titles but they're lobbyists. They were
checking to see when it (the formulary) was going to
be published. One time a couple of them came to my
office and when I was talking to one, the other had
an attache case in front of him, on his lap, I
couldn't see what he was doing at first. He was
taking down what I said verbatim. Everything.
They didn't fool around. This was the first law of
its kind in the nation.
The present administrator to the commission, Irving Tattlebaum,
* For the most part the lobbyists were not the same who had
fought the Serlin bill in the Legislature. They were mostly
lawyers or veteran lobbyists. The lobbyists who frequented the
public health department were mostly full-time employees of the
various drug companys such as Clem Delahunt, Upjohn} A1 Mercury,
Eli Lily; Fred Weeks, Sandoz} and Michael Feimal, Wyeth. They
also worked in the Legislature. (Interview, Sister Joan Davis,
March, 1975. )
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a druggist, says, 'I’m quite friendly with the lobbyists here.
We f ve argued back and forth (about the law). That’s part of
the game."
The formulary was completed and mailed out to Massachusetts
doctors and druggists in January, 1972. It took the commission,
working with a druggist-consultant, until June 1971 to compile
the list of 375 pharmaceutical products for the formulary, and
another several months to secure funds for printing and
distribution. A public hearing on the formulary was held June
30, during which Dermit Shea, executive secretary of the
Consumer ' s Council, declared:
Surely in this day of rising medical costs the
physicians of the commonwealth must be or should
be interested in the use of low cost chemical
equivalents to brand name drugs in order to
benefit the low income consumer, the retired, and
for, in fact, all consumers. ®
Contrary to Shea’s hopeful assertion, the first of several
surveys on the effect of the law - taken less than a year after
the public hearing and three months after the law took effect -
showed that physicians were prescribing generics no more often
than before the law. Conducted during April, 1972, by Prof.
Harold Silverman, chairman of the department of pharmaceutics
at Massachusetts College of Pharmacy, the independent survey
queried 200 doctors and druggists in the Boston area. The survey
indicated that all but a few doctors were prescribing as they
always had. Silverman characterized the general response of
physicians as:
We are not ivory-towered scientists and we’ll
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prescribe as we damn well please. We will not do what somebureaucratic agency tells us. We’ll treat our patients
the way we want, *
Parnes, alternate chairman of the commission, reacted
philosophically to news of the survey. '‘The older doctors will
never accept the law. They think it’s some form of socialized
medicine." Parnes also noted the inconvenience built-in to the
new prescribing procedure:
Doctors have found the formulary inconvenient to
carry about, bothersome to consult and at times
embarrassing to use in front of patients... doctors
find trade names easy to use while they find more
complicated, sometimes tongue-twisting generic names
difficult to remember, pronounce and spell and time-
consuming to write. For example, the trade name K.WELL
is far easier to use than its generic name gamma benzene
hexachkoride and the brand name PEN-VEE K is less tricky
than its generic name phenoxyraenthyl pebecillin
potassium. ’ 1
Another reason that many doctors did not follow the law
was the doubts they harbored about the quality of some generic
drugs. Dr. John Turner, then president of Hampden County
Medical Society, predicted*
1 think the basic fear of doctors is the
quality of the generic drugs. We have more con-
fidence in trademark drugs, which we've dealt with
for a long time. If I had a headache I wouldn't
be too worried about the quality of the drug. If
I had blood poisoning, I would... Doctors would
have to explain their feelings to patients^ You
might call it enlightened self-interest.
There were doctors who weren't even bothering to explain their
feelings to patients but were writing prescriptions as they
always had. A survey of compliance with the law conducted
by the prestigious medical journal - Medical Economics,
founds
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...many doctors are writing formulary prescriptions
with brand names only — although this violates the
law. Many other doctors are consistently writing *no
substitution’ on prescriptions.
The law was foundering but several personnel changes
were being made in the public health department which would
breathe life in the half-hearted administration. Frechette left t
department in January, 1972 to work for a private medical program,
Lichtenstein’s pending request for a transfer to the epilepsy
program was granted.
In May, 1972, Dr. William Bicknel was named health
commissioner. Where his predecessor had displayed, at best,
indifference towards the law, Bicknel was a staunch advocate.
He designated Thomas Kerns, a specialist in the Medical Care
Division, as the new administrator. In June, at Bicknel*
s
behest, Kerns took the first state survey of compliance with
the law. It covered five drug stores and three welfare
*
department offices. The results were similar to the outcome
of Silverman’s survey. Few doctors were following the law.
Less than 25 per cent of the prescriptions for drugs covered
13
by the law included the generic name.
So low was the rate of compliance that the Formulary
Commission decided to conduct a second survey covering a second
three months of compliance under the law. If there was no
increase in the rate, Parnes said, the commission would make
Suggestions to the governor and Legislature regarding what we
feel should be done.” But Parnes added his personal belief that
* By order of the governor, the law was applied to all
prescriptions in which the state paid part of the cost, a move
which later led some liberals to charge that the poor were being
given low quality drugs. Interview, Serlin, July 1975
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"what we are going to have to do is have a major campaign to
convince doctors and druggists to convince the public that
generic drugs are good." 14 But without any funds, there could
be no such program. With the Legislature 1 s continued failure
to authorize appropriations, there would be no funds.
Probably to no one’s surprise, the results of the second
survey were as dismal as those of the first. In October, 1972,
the commission recommended to Bicknell that a fundamental change
be made — that the responsibility for providing the generic
version of the drug be shifted in the law from the physician to
the pharmacist. Bicknell concurred and asked Hiam, the department
counsel, to incorporate the commission’s suggestions with some of
the commissioner’s into a draft of a proposed amendment. Bicknell
suggested* an increase in the number of commission members to
seven, the additional two being non-medical members, thus opening
the commission to consumer advocates; and a provision that the
commission’s activities be subject to the commissioner’s approval,
thus bringing the commission into the department. The amendment
stated:
A pharmacist shall on receipt of an oral or written
prescription containing the name of a drug indicated by
brand or generically, dispense an equivalent generic drug
listed in the formulary prepared by the drug formulary
commission... which is the least expensive drug. If in
the opinion of a physician an equivalent generic drug
should not be dispensed, he may indicate in the manner of
his choice on the prescription "Do not substitute'
1
except that the indication shall not be pre-printed on
the prescription.
Entitled "An Act Amending the Drug Formulary Law," the bill was
introduced as H182 in January, 1973, but never went anywhere. The
( Social
bill did not "receive much support and the committee
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Welfare Committee) was not very favorable to it," according to
Lucy Farmer, Bicknell's legislative aide. M We were outweighed
by the pharmaceutical companies
,
M she says. The lobbyists'
arguments, used to oppose H182 and later bills to strengthen
the drug law, had a familiar ring to them. The legislative
fight over generic drugs had started again. Following is a
legislative staff summary of those arguments*
- Allowing across the board substitution is anti-
consumer because the legislation assumes that drugs
listed in the Massachusetts Formulary are generically
and therapeutically equivalent. The Massachusetts
Drug Formulary is a drug list; no equivalence is assured.
- The bills which propose to amend the present
Formulary assume that all drug products having the
same generic name will produce an identical therapeutic
effect on patients. However, significant variation has
been noted in such factors as; time required to take
effect, duration of effect-strength of medication
actively working in the patient (bio-availability), and
individual patient reaction.
- The proposition that the Food and Drug Administra-
tion can assure therapeutical equivalence among products
having the same chemical composition is a matter of
scientific debate. FDA is a regulatory agency and as such
does not assure that products made by different companies
are therapeutically equivalent.
- Amendments to the present law would seriously
damage pharmacy's traditional relationship with medicine,
reduce the protection now afforded to consumers from
pharmaceutical products that are unsafe and ineffective,
and increase the liability risks for both pharmacists
and physicians.
- Legislation mandating generics is not necessary at
this time as physicians are already prescriging generically
approximately 10 per cent of the time, where, in their
professional judgment, they feel it is safe to do so.
- Present information indicates that there are no
measurable savings to consumers in the states where
substitution is legal. Massachusetts DPH cannot cite
any substantial savings to consumers.
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- Latest consumer surveys dealing with both quality
and prescription prices indicate where the average
consumer understands the implications of generic sub-
stitution, he prefers to have his physician make the
decision as to the choice of medicine to be dispensed.
Farmer learned a lot during the short life of H182. She
quickly set to work preparing a battle plan to push through a
proposed amendment for the 1974 session of the Legislature.
Her strategy stressed the value of gaining support, as a memo
she sent to Irving Tattlebaum, the new Formulary Commission
administrator indicates:
We should contact all of the following organiza-
tions for support - The Consumers Council Executive
Office for Elder Affairs, Executive Office of
Consumer Affairs, Legislative Council on Older
Americans, Western Massachusetts Public Interest
Research Group ... and any other interested groups
you can suggest ...
We should prepare a letter to the Legislature along
with a brief fact sheet to be distributed prior to the
public hearing. The timing will be important.
We should meet with staff members of the Social
Welfare Committee before the hearing.
We should prepare a fact sheet for internal use
which will enumerate points against the bill that
may come up and then list rebuttals.
We should think about planning for the hearings,
who we might want to testify, etc., and just generally
make sure our people and positions can be well
coordinated and our presentation informative,
profe s s i ona 1 and toe, eth er . *
Farmer, Bicknell, Hiam and members of the Formulary
Commission subsequently met several times and rroduced H126,
"An Act Amending the Drug Formulary Law," which was introduced
in the 1974 session.
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The bill was much like its predecessor of 1973. It
increased the size of the commission from five to seven; re-
quired pharmacists to dispense the least expensive “reasonably
available therapeutically equivalent drug unless the pnysician
indicated on the prescription *D© i\!ot Substitute* j and required
pharmacists to decline to prescribe a drug that, in his opinion,
“was not of accepable quality.*
The bill also included a provision that had been suggested
by the commission* a $100 fine for any pharmacists who filled
a prescription not written lawfully. That no one in the depart-
ment or on the commission ever seriously proposed such a fine
for doctors who disobeyed the law reflects the relative esteem in
*
which the two professions are held. It may also reflect
professional sympathy on the part of the physicians on the
18
commission and in the department.
Nonetheless, the amendment accorded the pharmacist a
greater role in the prescription process than he had at the
time. This no doubt was because of the influence of the
commission’s administrator, Tattlebaum, who was a druggist,
and Denmark, a commission member and president of the Board
* In a letter dated Nov. 20, 1973 Andra Hotchkiss, deputy
general counsel of the Department of Public Health, indicated
that, given the existence of the Formulary Commission position
paper allowing the doctor to decide when to prescribe generically,
and given the lack of sanctions for violators of the law, no
prosecution would be possible.
Then-Atty. Gen. Robert Quinn and Serlln both said there
were discussions about doctor-violators of the law, but punish-
ing them was never seriously considered.
As for the esteem in which the doctor is held, a Gallup
Poll released Aug. 22, 1976 shows* Of 11 professions and
occupations, the public rated highest for honesty and esteem
medical doctors. News Item, High Rating. Given....
Poll . New York Times, Aug. 22, 1976, p. 3T.
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of Trustee* of the American Pharmaceutical Association. (The
AfhA had issued a white paper in 1971 in effect advocating
the use of generics as part of its demand fox recognition of
the druggist’s role as purchasing agent for the consumer.)
1C
Likewise, American society-at-large was becoming more
consumer conscious. A good indication of this development in
Massachusetts was the unusually large number of amendments to
the drug law that were filed in the X974 session. H126 was one
of four aimed at strengthening the law, which once had trouble
getting passed. But Ralph Nader was a household word by 1974.
In that year, moreover, Nader and a coalition of consumer groups
filed a bill in the Congress to create a Consumer Protection
20
Agency to protect consumer rights on the federal level.
National attention was focused on the generic drug issue
in December, 1973 when Casper Weinberger, secretary of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, announced that
the federal government would be reimbursing druggists who
filled prescriptions for Medicaid and Medicare only for the
lowest cost version of a drug. The cost control proposal,
known as the Maximum Allowable Cost program, was estimated to
have a savings potention of $50 million its first year and
more later based on a $3 billion federal drug expenditure
annually.
Still, Farmer and her colleagues were surprised at the
enthusiasm for the generic drug issue in 1974. he 19/4
bill created the most hoopla,*’ she says. ‘‘There hasn’t oeen
as much enthusiasm for a (generic drug) bill since.
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On Feb. 26 the four proposed amendments were given a heari
before the Social Welfare Committee, whose makeup had changed
considerably since the Serlin days. Legislators had retired or
were defeated and were replaced, on the whole, by younger and more
liberal representatives. Similarly, the audience at the hearing
was of a different character than in the days when Serlin sat on
the committee. Instead of being filled with lobbyists opposed to
the generic drug law, the audience was filled with supporters.
In the audience were representatives of the consumer oriented
Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group, Americans for
Democratic Action and State Sen, Alan Sisitsky, D-Springf ieid, a
23leading Senate liberal who had filed the other drug bills.
Bicknell, testifying for the department’s bill, predicted
that the American Medical Association would oppose the bill
because of "economic interests" that bear "no relationship to the
welfare of the patient."
It is still difficult to separate economic interests
and professional standards. I am told that 42.8 per cent
of the AMA revenue, or $13,6 million is derived from
drug advertising in various journals of the American
Medical Association. *“4
Bicknell* s words were not warmly received by Senate Committee
Chairman Jack Backman, D-Brookline. He demanded that Bicknell
back up his charges or withdraw them. 3ut Bicknell stood
r ast
and refused to withdraw the charge. "He (Backman) went uo the
wall," Bicknell says. "His reaction was very atypical. He’s
usually very liberal." Backman may have been angry over what
he thought was the Department of Public Health’s heavy-handedness.
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Sister Joan Davis, a member of Hackman *
5
staff, says, MTh*
hearing turned into a real inquisition as to why the Welfare
Department hadn’t been in on a lot of the negotiations for the
bill, and was it trying to turn the elderly and the poor into
second class citizens’* by requiring state-financed health programs
to use generic drugs.
Whatever the reason for Backman’s hostility, it spelled doom
for a stronger drug bill in 1974. The committee gave the
department bill an unfavorable reading and reported out the
w more innocuous" - in Sister Davis’s words - ADA bill. The
legislative session ended with no final action taken on it.
But towards the end of the 1974 session. House Speaker
David M. Bartley, D-Holyoke, announced the creation of the
Health Care Committee. It was indicative of the growing inter-
est in health related matters. Bartley, according tc Farmer,
... felt that health was certainly a coming thing.
He felt there would be more and more interest in
health-related issues and that there ought to be a
substantive committee to deal with health care matters.
It was recognized as a national trend.
Also, in late 1974, Sister Davis took a step that raised
hopes anew for a stronger drug law. As she recalled*
We were faced with a situation where so-and-so
said this and so»and-so said that, but never to each
other, with a third person who's working on the
legislation, there. That’s what I decided to do. I
asked the chairman (Social Welfare Committee Chairman
Rep, Charles Flaherty, D-Cambridge) and he said sure,
go ahead.
Sister Davis called together the drug company lobbyists
and consumer representatives and held a series of meetings to
forge a compromise. She succeeded*
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...
XLwes a gr?at thin9 to see happen. People fromfcot i sides came In and we obtained a consensus
through about six or seven meetings.
The consensus was tested when the Health Care Committee
held hearings on the half dozen bills filed to strengthen the
drug law in the 1975 session. The bills were now all Senate
rather than House ^originated. "It’s easier to get a bill passed
through a 40-member body like the Senate than a 240
-member body
like the House, " was the reason for the change, according to
Peter Lappin, a member of the Health Care Committee.
On March 24, 1975, the committee held a hearing on the
25
bills. Crowding the hearings were supporters and opponents
of the drug law, now ostensibly brought together to band behind
one bill that would emerge and become law. Gov. Michael Dukakis,
who as a representative in 1970 had cast a vote for the Serlin
bill, sent written testimony:
I would like to express my support for the
bills before your committee that would strengthen
the Generic Drug Law ... The legislation before /eu
would further the intent of the 1970 law and deal
with some of the problems that became apparent dur-
ing its implementation.
... I would only add that, in addition to the
potention savings for Massachusetts consumers,
which have been professionally estimated to be
approximately $15-20 million, the savings to the
state itself in prescription costs for Medicaid
patients would be In the neighborhood of
$3-4 million. 26
The bill representing the consensus, S 1947, was indeed
reported out favorably by the committee. It incorporated several
changes in earlier bills filed by the public health department
but being a compromise was substantially weaker. Entitled "An
Act Clarifying the Generic Drug Law," it required that each
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prescription contain two printed lines, “interchange permitted,”
%
and “dispense as written.” One was to be signed by the physician.
If neither was signed, the prescription was invalid. If inter-
change was permitted, the pharmacist was to fill the prescription
with "a less expensive reasonably available interchange drug
27product as listed in the most current formulary."
The use of “interchange drug product" for generic drug
was no idle phrasemaking. It was a deft verbal sidestep of
the dispute over the quality of generic drugs, which In earlier
bills, had been referred to as “equivalent.” The use of that
terra, according to Formulary Commission administrator Tattlebaura,
was “like waving a red flag in front of the drug company
lobbyists.”
“Interchangeable drug product” was defined in the bill
as "a product containing a drug or drugs in the same amount of
the same active ingredients in the same dosage form as other
28
products with the same generic or chemical name.
A proposed budget for the Formulary Commission, which
would be expanded from five to seven members under the bill, was
drawn up by Sister Davis s Cost for the first year was estimated
29
at $49,806.
As it turned out, however, there was no need to worry
about funding. The compromise did not survive for long. When
S 1947 was in the Ways and Means Committee, Bernashe managed to
tack an amendment onto the bill which consumer supporters of a
stronger drug law considered anathema. The Bernashe amendment
yyouXd have delayed implementation oi a stronger law, by tying
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it to the list of drugs that would be covered under the federal
MAX program proposed in 1973 by Sec. Weinberger. The list was
not completed and, according to the ADA* s Williams, was not
30
expected to be completed for several years. ~
Consumer advocates saw the amendment as a sellout on the
part of Bernashe to drug lobbyists. His amendment and S 1947
31died in ways and Means. Once agaia, the hopes fox a stronger
drug law had proved to be premature.
**************
At this writing, a new amendment to strengthen the drug
law, similar to S 1947, but sponsored by Rep. Louis Rertonazzi,
D-Milford, was being considered by the 1976 session of the
Legislature.
Bertonazzi said he was "pretty confident" that that the bill
would "not be sidetracked this year.
“
Even if it did pass, however, that would by no means
guarantee that the new law would be observed. As the sorry
state of the present drug law shows, there is sometimes a great
difference "between the reality and the pronouncement” regarding
new laws, according to Speaker of the House David M. Bartley,
D-Holyoke.
Bartley, who seems to have taken an attitude of benign
neglect towards the Serlin bill said "the legislature sets the
ideal (in legislation) and the goal of that idean oftentimes
takes five to seven years to be refined, to fully work.
But Bartley added that what he calls "the technological
question" regarding the drug law — the bioequivalence issue -
J
never been answered at least to my satisfaction! is there
such a thing as a true generic equivalent?"
ihat question will be further explored, and the author* s
conclusions will be presented, in the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION
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The experience of the Generic Drug Law gives credence to
Edgar Litt’s observation that "there is little professional
policy orientation in the operation of (Massachusetts) state
government." ^
Political considerations were foremost while the bill was
in the Legislature for three years and later when the law was
in the Department of Public Health.
This was in part because the drug issue came at a time
when the state was undergoing a political transition. The years
1966-70 were years in which the state was making "the vital turn
2from the old ethnic to new pragmatic politics."
The stage had been set by economic and social changes in
the 1950* s and early 1960’s. First, the state’s economic base
shifted from older industries that had thrived during the war
to more modern ones such as electronics and research. That shift,
in turn, attracted a new middle class work force of highly educated
persons.
They settled where the industries were, often in the suburbs
on land less expensive than in the central cities - on Route 128,
outside Boston, for example. To these suburban settlements were
added younger and more mobile urban residents who were attracted
3
by the new industries, the distance from the cities, or both.
This new middle class demanded a more sophisticated leader-
ship than did the ethnic-oriented constituency that characterized
post-war Massachusetts politics. This constituency was fading wit
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the assimilation of the offspring of immigrant and first and
second generation Americans. As the 1960's opened, Duane Lockhard
wrote *
...the pull of ethnic association is on the
decline. One measure is the concurrent decline
of the old fashioned political boss and his kind
of political machine which depended so much on
the bewilderment of ethnic minorities for votes.
(p. 308) 4
So much was it declining that in the 1966 and 1970 elections
a "whole generation of political leaders" were replaced by legis-
lators tending to be more "public regarding" or receptive to the
social concerns that characterized the 1960's.
Such liberal legislators were in the minority during the
late 1960's but managed at times to forge a working alliance
with liberal-to-moderate Republican legislators and governors
of that period. The result, one writer noted, was that the
Legislature "rolled along like a great big liberal machine
churning out social programs and plodding through thickets of
obstructionist politics."
The Generic Drug Law, then, was among the "remarkable
progressive legislation" of the time, as another writer called
it. In 1970, for example, in addition to the drug law, the
Legislature also passed America's first no-fault insurance law,
a "bill of rights for consumers," and a consumer unit pricing
law. 6
But the drug law was doomed to failure. It lacked a solid
base in either the new consumer, issue-oriented politics or the
old-style politics that coexisted together in the late 1960's.
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State Rep. I. Edward Serlin, D-Mattapan, was of the old
politics, but had few friends among his contemporaries. His
independent nature, the fact, in Senate President Maurice
Donahue’s words, that Serlin was "a solo performer rather than
a team player,*' alienated the practitioners of the old politics.
His independent nature, however, also kept at a distance the
liberal-oriented legislators and lobby groups that would have
been natural supporters of his bill.
Serlin, a Jewish lawyer elected to represent an urban
Jewish district, was feeling quite severely the effects of
white flight from Mattapan: it was to win votes with the
elderly whites who remained in his district, that he filed the
generic drug bill.
The bill aimed at cutting drug costs, and he thought it
would be of special benefit to the elderly. But they wer6 vir-
tually powerless to help him pass it.
Serlin unwittingly played the role of what Prof. James Q.
Wilson has called the policy entreprenuer , M— one who must
appeal to an unorganized majority, the members of which may not
expect to be substantially or directly benefitted by the law.
Serlin’ s independent nature contributed to this circumstance
in two wayss l) by keeping at a distance natural allies like the
few existing liberal-oriented interest groups? and 2) by incurring
the enmity of several key legislative leaders, at least to the
point where they were inclined to accept the arguments oi opposing
lobbyists or were indifferent to Serlin* s bill.
His failure to muster any organizational support in behalf
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of his bill, Serlin later admitted, was a major mistake.
"lhat's one thing I would do differently if I were in the
Legislature again, ; he said. '’I would have found some organi-
zation that was interested in the bill and I would have had
that organization fighting for that bill. Human nature being
what it is, no one wants to help another person if the other
person gets all the honor and glory.’*
Serlin also regrets not having realized the impact his
bill would have - especially the opposition it would engender.
"Sometimes you don’t know if it’s important. This type of bill,
I should have realized, was extremely important. I should have
obtained the co-sponsorsh:’ p of, say, senior citizens or different
consumers' groups. I didn't realize the importance of this. So,
I would say to you if you're going to file legislation, I say
it's wonderful to file it in your own name but you won't get
lasting support unless you file it in conjunction with some
supporting organization."
Support was a prerequisite for the drug bill because of
the nature and extent of the lobbying against it. It was the
lobbying that most set the experience of the drug law apart
from other bills passed at the time.
The nature of the lobbying was rare because of the parti-
cipation of doctors and druggists, who, given their position in
society as professionals, were bound to have a special impact
on legislators.
The other unusual circumstance was the high number of
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lobbyists — ~ more than one legislator commented on the intense
efforts and number of lobbyists.
It w9s this size and intensity of the interest group activity,
rather than the content — the question of drug safety which the
groups raised — that was the decisive factor in blocking the
Serlin bill.
No less an authority than Donahue, then president of the
Senate, which twice blocked the Serlin bill, said the safety
factor of generics was at best only secondary in importance.
Another striking feature of the lobbying was the easy
access which the lobbyists had to the legislative policy making
process. Merck lobbyist Paul Burns and Dunn, for example, were
called on for advice and actually assisted in the drafting of
the generic drug amendments. Such striking access was in one
sense afforded by the dominance of the Democratic party in the
House and Senate.
Under such conditions, as V. 0. Key and others have noted,
conservative interests with money to spend manage to influence
government to the exclusion of other interests. Expanding on
this, Duane Lockard has noted:
...in one party states it is easier for a few
powerful interests to manage the government of the
state without party interference since the parties
are not representative of the particular elements
that might pose opposition to the dominant interest
groups. The parties do not represent the have-less
elements for the simple reason that politically there
is no necessity to do so.
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Given this dominance, then, what was chiefly responsible
for the drug bill’s ultimate passage? Prof, Wilson wrote of his
policy entrepreneur, that "Without special political circumstances —
a crisis, a scandal, extraordinary majorities ... the support of
the media — the normal barriers to legislative innovation (by
the entrepreneur) may prove insuperable." Such a special political
circumstance was primarily responsible for the passage of the drug
bill: The support of the media in the person of Thomar Gallagher,
Boston Herald Traveller columnist.
Like Serlin, his friend, and Dunn, his nemesis, Gallagher
was of the old politics and was not particularly prone to support
in his columns particular issues, such as the drug bill. His
column was widely read in the State House and when he did take
on the generic drug issue, legislators were apt to take notice.
Moreover, Gallagher created the belief among legislators
that there was mushrooming public sentiment on behalf of the
drug bill. Because what legislators believe is of primary
importance, the fact that there was no great public support for
the bill, as later indifference to the law showed, is beside the
point.
Several key legislators, Speaker David Bartley and Senator
Beryl Cohen among them, agree that Gallagher's columns were the
key to the bill's passage. Serlin said, "Gallagher was a power-
ful factor. He got me going off the ground when I filed it. He
was a big part, a bi$ reason for the success, if you can call it
that."
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Even lobbyist Dunn gives Gallagher credit:
It (the bill) passed largely through the efforts
of Gallagher. All the legislators down here are
conditioned to editorials and editorial-like pieces
that tout some bill or try to kill some bill. They
are very influential.
This suggests that the press can play a positive and
sometimes decisive role in the passage of consumer legislation.
But the treatment of the law once it was passed and passed into
the hands of the Department of Public Health suggests an un-
fortunate corollary : that the politics of administration can
undo the positive work of the press — by undermining this same
consumer legislation.
The ideal administration. Max Weber has written, is
bureaucracy in which considerations of emotion or sentiment
are excluded and in which authority is structured in terms of
impersonal positions and offices rather than specific identifiable
8
individuals.
Weber of course meant this description as an ideal, and
allowed for effects of informal relationships and other factors.
However, the performance of the Department of Public Health re-
garding the drug law was the antithesis of rational bureaucratic
administration. Politics not policy was the first consideration.
For example, the decision of Health Commissioner Alfred
Frechette not to push for implementation of the law, and not
to give this responsibility to George .Michael, deputy commissioner
in charge of the Food and Drug Division, was based on personal
and political, not policy, considerations.
The Formulary Commission and its effects on the law
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further illustrate non-policy considerations
,
as well as the
unintended effects of legislation. The creation of the commission
to compile the formulary, as Dr. Leo Parnes had feared, delayed
implementation of the lav/ for more than a year.
And the professional sympathies of the doctor-members of
the commission showed up in the position paper that it drafted,
stating, in effect, that doctors could depart from the lawful
prescription-writing procedure if they felt they should. This
and the lack of sanctions resulted in the wholesale disobedience
or indifference toward the law by doctors.
In summary, the demise of the law in the health department
illustrates what policy analyst Larry Wade has noted: “Neither
theory nor institutions exist for the sustained protections
through public controls of consumer as opposed to producer
interests." The latter are well organized while the former
are not. Wade further wrote:
...the impulses which lie behind reform-inspired
regulations invariably lose their force — become
quiescent themselves.
...when the parties involved are, on the one hand,
a well-organized and well-financed producer group
with a permanent and major interest in the policy
involved and, on the other, an amorphous consumer
group without sufficient incentives to sustain long-
term involvement with the policy, the initial purpose
of the policy is apt to be subverted.
There have been isolated developments in favor of rational
administration of the drug law — the arrival in the health department
of such policy-minded administrators as Commissioner William Bickneil
and aide Lucy Farmer, for example. However, their arrival came
after the damage had been done to the drug law.
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Nevertheless, there may be a second chance. As this
paper was being completed. Gov. Michael Dukakis (who, as a state
representative, had voted for the original law) signed the
strengthened Generic Drug Law that had been sponsored by Rep.
Louis Bertonazzi, chairman of the Health Care Committee.
FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER 1
84
1. U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Health, Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare, Hearings on the Prescription Drug
Industry, Bjcanis and Generics (July 22, 1974) p. 132
2. P. Lee and M. Silverman, PllliL. „.Profits and Politic
s
(Berkeleys University of California, 1974) pp, 168-9
3. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, advertising
insert. Subject 1 Columbia Journalism Review
(July, 1976)
4. Pharmaceutical fjanufacturers Association About Rx Drugs
(Washington, D.C. : 1974)
5. Interview, PMA spokesman Richard Hamilton, July, 1975.
6. Interview, Dr. Leo Parnes, Formulary Commission,
September, 1975
7. Op Cit PMA advertising insert, Subject 4
8. Crout, R. FDA, Pharmacy Interaction , a paper delivered to the
National Drug Trade Conference, Montego Bay, Jamaica,
Jan. 10, 1974
9. News Item Drug Prices are Too High . Springfield Daily News,
March 22, 1975, p. 7
10. News Item Senator Attacks Drug Companies . New York Times,
June 22, 1973. p. 15
11. Interview, Medical Economics, April 1, 1974, vol. 51,
Mo. 7, p. 172
12. Graedon, Joseph, The People's Pharmacy (New Yorks St.
13. FDA Consumer, Brand vs. Generics . March, 1973, p. 4
14. Wardell, W. and Lasagna, L. , Requ 1 at ion a nd. Drug Devel oprnent
(Washingtons American Enterprise Institute, 1975, p. 127
15. Op cit, Silverman and Lee, p. 147
16. U.S. Dept, of Health, Education and Welfare Task Force on
Prescription Drugs Report and Recommendations (Washington*
1968) iii
17. Ibid, p. 27
18. Ibid, p. 28
19. Op cit, Silverman and Lee, pp. 168-9
20. U.S. Office of Technology Assessment Drug Bloe qulva lence
(Washington* 1974) p. 22
21. Consumer Reports How To Pay Less for Prescription DrupA.
January, 1975, pp. 3-5
22. Interview, Irving Tattlebaum, Department of Public Health,
July, 1975.
23. News Release Drug Research Board Urges Change i g, Drug
Substitution Laws . NationalResearch Counsel, Jan. 21,
1973, Washington
24. News Release, CEB Clarifies October Resolution, National
Research Counsel, July 29, 1975, Washington
25. American Pharmaceutical Association The S D-PJL&
in Product Selection (Washington: 1971) p. 20
26. Academy of Pharmaceutical Sciences Critique and. P9.n&e.
(Washington* 1972)
85
F OOTNOTES ( c ontinued
)
onmmjL
27. New Item A.
:
M,A., aidg.g,...Pxiye on. Drug Cost Cut . New York
Times, July 20, 1975, p. 21
28. News Commentary A.M.A, Sues in a Hassle Over Drugs . New
Yori Daily News, Aug. 3, 1975, p. 8
29. Harraer, R. M. American Medical Avarice (New Yorks Abelard,
1975)
30. Op cit. Consumer Reports, p. 4
31. Op cit Task Force on Prescription Drugs The Drug Makers a nd
the..Mg , Distributors . background paper, p. 29
32. Ibid p. 27
33. Ibid p. 28
34. Ibid p. 28
35. Op cit subcommittee hearings Brand and Generics . Part 4,
May 3, 1974 p. 1273
36. Neve Item Doctor Admits Being Bribed . Springfield Daily
News, May 16, 1974, p. 12
37. Op cit, subcommittee bearings Brand and Generics . Part 5,
p. 2394
38. Op cit. Task Force on Prescription Drugs, background paper,
p. 29
39. Op cit subcommittee hearings Brand and Generics . Part 3,
March 8, 1974, p. 729
40. Op cit, Silverman and Lee, p. 169
41. Ibid, p. 17; Op cit, Graeber, p. 3; and News Commentary
Medical News Report. New York Times, June 6, 1976, p. 37
42. U.S. Senate Select Committee on Monopoly, Competitive
Problems in the Drug Industry . Summary and Analysis,
(Washingtons 19727" p. 33
43. Ibid, p. 34
44. Op cit, Task Force on Prescription Drugs Report and
Recommendations, p, 11
45. Ibid, p
46. Council on Economic Priorities In Whose Hands? August-
November, 1-73, p. 27, New York, vol. 4, No. 4 and 5
47. Ibid
48. Op cit Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry , p. 9
49 Ibid, p. 10
50. National Conference of State Legislatures, State Leqj.S.l,a,tM.re,s.
vol. 1, No. 3, p. 3, Philadelphia
86
FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER II
1. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Bulletin of Committee Work.
1968 legislative session, p. 523; 1969 session, p. 67A;
Bill History Index
. 1970 session, p. 3212.
2. Interview with Serlin, July, 1975.
3. Interview with Harvey Friedman, Pr 0f. of Policical Science,
University of Massachusetts, January, 1976.
4. News Commentary, Hyde Park Must Learn Lessons of Mattapan
by Michael Ansara, Boston Globe, June" 4, 1972, p. 27*.
5. Interview, Maurice Donahue, August, 1975.
6. Letter from Volpe to Serlin, Jan. 28, 1968.
7. Pierce, Neal R. The New England States (1976, New York:
Norton) p. 74.
8. News Commentary Budget Cut of Millions Seen by Thomas
Gallagher, Boston Herald Traveller, Jan. 24, 1968, p. 26.
9. News Commentary Move To Cut Drug Costs Gains by Thomas
Gallagher, Boston Herald Traveller, Feb. 22, 1968, p. 42.
10. News Item Entertainment Effective Tool of Lobbyists . Spring-
field Daily News, Feb. 4, 1976, p. 14.
11. Bulletin of Committee Work, 1968, op. cit., p. 291.
12. League of Women Voters The Massachusetts Legislature
(1975, Boston, Cambridge, Harvard University Press)
13. Ibid
. ,
p. 66.
14. Truman. David B. The Governmental Process (1951, New York:
Knopf) p. 37
15. Bulletin of Committee Work, 1968, op. cit. p. 523.
16. Truman, op. cit. p. 393.
17. House Bill 4395, 1968 session; Bulletin of Committee Work, 1968
session, op. cit. p. 523.
18. Interview with Serlin, July, 1975, with Harmon, November, 1975.
19. Senate Bill 1109, 1968 session.
20. Bulletin of Committee Work, 1968 session, op. cit. p. 523.
21. Interview, Kenneally, November, 1975.
22. Ibid.
23. Nev>s Commentary Serlin Renews Drug Fight by Thomas Gallagher,
Boston Herald Traveller, Oct. 9, 1968, p. 28.
24. Ibid.
25. Bulletin of Committee Work, 1969 session, op. cit., p. 67A.
26. Interview, Parnes, September, 1975.
27. Congressional Record Senate . July 8, 1969 S7681-4.
28. Bulletin of Committee Work, 1969 session, op. cit., p. 197A.
29. House Bill 2037.
30. Interview, Parnes, op. cit.
31. Bill History Index, 1960 session, op. cit., p. 3141.
32. Ibid. p. 3212.
33. Senate Bill 1360.
34. Bill History Index . 1970 session, op. cit. p. 3141.
35. Senate Bill 1367.
36. Bill History Index . 1970 session, op. cit., p. 33 14.
87
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
^Sil£0al._.of the SenatP
i
1970
Commonwealth of Massachusetys
session, p. 1970.
24
R^r0n H111> SPrln9field Daily
Governor's Press Office Release No. AG-56 Auo 14 ,o,nBill History Index, 1970 session, op. cit! T’ 3& '
Press
,
T
pp
i
^* 4^43y
niteCi Klnqdom Ne" Y^rk University
88
FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER III
1. Truman, D. B. The Governme ntal Proces s (New York: Knopf.
1951)
2. Senate Bill 1367.
3. Burack, Richard, Dr. Handbook of Pre scription Drue s (New
York: Pantheon, 19671, p. 4
4. Ibid., p. 12.
5. Truman, op. cit., p. 393.
6. Governor, s Press Office, release No. DC-36 Dec. 21, 1970.
7. Truman, op. cit., p. 439.
8. Consumers’ Council News, June 30, 1971.
9. News Item, Survey Shows Doctors Ignore Drug Formulary .
Springfield Daily News, June 12, 1972, p. 23.
10. News Item, Officials Will Delay Push for Drug Obedience
.
Springfield Daily News, July 17, 1972, p. 27.
11. News Item, Generic Drugs Can Save You Money
. Springfield
Daily News, Oct/ 17, 1970, p. 1
12. News Item, Let Druggists Substitute for the Drugs you
Provide ? . Medical Economics, April 16, 1973, vol. 50,
No. 8, p. 134.
13. News Item, Springfield Daily News, Julv 17, 1972, op. cit.
14. Ibid.
15. House Bill 182, 1972 session.
16. Background Memo from Sister Joan Davis, Committee on
Health Care, March 24, 1975.
17. House Bill 182, op. cit.
18. See discussion in Chapter I.
19. News Item, Bac k Consumer Agency Bil l. Springfield Union,
June 28, 1974, p. 18.
20. News Item, Government Plan ... . New York Times, Au . 23,
1976, p. 11.
21. News Item, More Effective Law Sought . Springfield Daily
News, Jan. 7, 1974, p. 33.
22. Interview with Sisitsky, February, 1976.
23. News Item, Bickne ll’s AMA Charge Stuns Drug Hearing .
Boston Herald Traveller, Feb. 27, 1972, p. 3.
24. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Bulletin on Committee Work ,
1975 session, p. 214.
25. Letter from Dukakis to Health Care Committee, March 25,
1975.
26. Senate Bill 1947, 1975 session.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Background Memo from Sister Joan Davis, op. cit.
30. Interview with Williams, July, 1976.
31. Interview with Davis, May, 1976,
89
FOOTNOTES
CHAPTER IV
1. Litt, Edgar, The Political Cultures of Massachuse tts
.
Cambridge: 197b, MIT Press, p. 158.
2. Pierce, Neal R., The New England States
.
New York, 1976,
William Norton & Co.
,
p. 67
3. News Item, Climate for Electronics Poor in New Engla nd.
New York Times, Nov. 12, 1976, ps. D1
4 Lockard, Duane, Mew England State Politics . Princeton: 1959,
Princeton University Press, p. 308.
5. News Item, Legislature Goes Home... . Boston Globe, Oct. 17,
1976, p. 1
6. Op cit. Pierce, p. 85
7. Op cit, Lockard, p. 150.
8. Nesbit, Robert, Sociology As An Art Form . New York: 1976,
Oxford University Press, p. 84.
9. Wade, Larry, The Elements of Public Policy . Columbus: 1072,
Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., p. 94.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Arnow, L. Earle
Burack, Richard
Babrook, Alec
Consumer Reports
Fuchs, Victor R.
Graedon, Joseph
Harmer, Ruth Mulvey
Kunnes, Richard
Lee, Philip and
Silverman, Milton
Litt, Edgar
Lockard, Duane
League of Women
Voters
Nisbet, Robert
Pierce, Neal R.
Schwartz, Harry
Truman, David
90
Health in a Bottle
Handbook of Prescription
Drugs
God Save the Common -
wealth
The Medicine Show
Medical Economic s
The People ’s Pharma cy
American Medic a l Av ari ce
Your Money or Your Life
Pills. Profits and
Politic s
The Political Culture s
of Massachusetts
New England State
Politics
The Massachusett s
State Government
Sociology as an Art Form
The New England States
The Cas e for American
Medic ine
The Governmental Process
New York: 1970,
J. B. Lippincott
New York: 1967,
Pantheon Books
Amherst: 1973,
University of Mass.
Press
Mount Vernon: 1961,
Consumer Reports
New York: 1974,
Basic Books
New York: 1976,
St. Martin’s Press
New York: 1964,
MacMillan
New York: 1971,
Dodd, Mead and Co.
Berkeley: 1974,
University of
California Press
Cambridge: 196b, / LIT
Princeton: 1959,
Princeton Univer-
sity Press
Cambridge: 197b,
Harvard University
Press
New York: 1976,
Oxford University
Press
New York: 1976, W. W.
Norton and Co.
New York: 1972,
David McKay Co.
New York: 1951,
Alfred Knopf
91
Wardell, William
and
Lasagna, Louis
Regulation and nruq
Development
Washington: 197b,
American Enterprise
Institute
Wade, Larry The Elements cf Public Columbus: 1972,
Charles E. Merrill
Publishing Co.
Policy
REPORTS
Brook., Paul A. Resistant Prices New York: 197b,
Council on Economic
Priorities
Cady, John F. Restricted Advertisinq Washington: 197b,
American Enterprise
Institute
and Competition
Council on Economic In Whose Hands New York: 1973, CEP
Priorities
Helms, Robert B, ed Druo Development and Washington: 197b,
American Enterprise
Institute
Marketinc
Peltzman, Sam Regulation of Pharma - Washington: 1974,
American Enterprise
Institute
ceutical Innovation
GOVERNMENT STUDIES
U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Sec-
retary, Task Force on Prescription Druqs Final Report.
Washington: 1969
U.S. Government
Printing Office
(Background Papers)
Ibid. The Drua Makers and Drua Distributors Washington: 1968
Ibid. The Drua Prescribers Washington: 1968
92
U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee
on Monopoly Competitive Problems in
"the Drug Industry Washingtons 1972
U.S, Gov’t Print-
ing Office
U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Subcommittee
on Health Hearings on the Prescrip-
tion Drug Industry Washington: 1974,
parts 3 to 5 U.S. Gov’t Print-
ing Office
MASSACHUSETTS STA1 £ GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Commonwealth of Mass. Bulletin of Committee Work . 1963-1970 Sessions.
Commonwealth of Mass. Senate Journal 1968-1970 Sessions.
Commonwealth of Mass. House Journal 1968-19/0 Sessions.
MAGAZINE ARTICLES
Should You Let Druggists Substitute?
An Interview with Ralph Hader Medical Economic; ,
April 1, 1974,
vol. 51, No. 7, p. 172
The Rise of theBureaucratic
State Public Interest,
Fall, 1975, p. 97
Wilson, James Q
93
Smith, James A.=
Smith, James A.
Gallagher, Thomas
Ansara, Michael
NEWSPAPER ARTICLE S
Law Gives Rpmedv on
Drug Costs
Survey Shows Doctors
Ignore Drug Formulary
Budget Cut of Millions
Seen
Move to Cut Drug Costs
Gains
Serlin Renews Drug Fight
Springfield Daily-
News, Oct. 19, 1970,
p. 1
Springfield Daily
News, June 12, 1972,
p. 23
Boston Herald Traveller
Jan. 24, 1968, p. 26
Boston Herald Traveller
Feb. 22, 1968, p. 42
Boston Herald Traveller
Oct. 9, 1968, p. 28
The Persistent Reo. Serlin
Boston Herald Traveller
April 2, 1971, p. 34
Hyde Park Must Learn... Boston Globe,
June 4, 1972, p. 27
94
INTERVIEWS
STATE REPRESENTATIVES: Robert Aronson of Sharon*, David Bartley
of Holyoke, Louis Bertonazzi of Milford, Vernon Farnsworth of"
Longmeadow*, Winston Healy of Charlemont*, Edward Epstein of
Boston, Peter Lappin of Springfield, Francis Lapointe of Chicopee.
Arthur i^cKenna of Springfield, .Robert Quinn of Boston, George
Sacco of Medford and Anthony M, Scibelli of Springfield.
STATE SENATORS: George Kenneally of Boston, Steven Davenport of
Boston, Ronald MacKenzie of Burlington, Donald Ryan of Springfield,
Maurice Donahue of Holyoke, Sam Harmon of Boston, James Burke of
Plymouth, Beryl Cohen of Norf olk-Suf folk and Alan Sisitsky.
EXEC’JTIVE DEPARTMENT: Lt. Gov. Donald Dwight, Health Commissioners
Alfred Frechette and William Bicknell, Food and Drug Director
George Michael, department members Lucy Farmer, Peter Hiam, Richard
Fleming, Carmine Durso, Ann Pettigrew, Thomas Kerns, Edward
Lichtenstein, Irving Tattiebaum; Attorney General’s Office Investi-
gator Joseph Harris? Formulary Commission members Leo Parnes,
George Denmark and Arthur Hadler.
LEGISLATIVE STAFF: Sister Joan Davis, Chris Reve, Stella Smith.
LOBBYISTS: Mrs. Connie Williams and Mrs. Elizabeth Parnes of
Americans for Democratic Action; Charles Dunn, Robert Holland
and John Noonan of the Massachusetts Medical Society; Robert
Sylvester, PaulBurns and Edward Carroll of Merck, Sharpe and Dohme;
Robert Gallagher of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association;
Clement Delahunt of Upjohn; Lem Permit and John Zamparelli of the
Massachusetts Pharmaceutical Society; Dermit Shea of the Massa-
chusetts Consumers Council; and Nate Parvin of the Massachusetts
Association of Consumers.
JOURNALISTS: Thomas Gallagher of the Boston Herald Traveller;
Steven Cohen of the Associated Press, State House Bureau; and
Walter Roach, United Press International, State House Bureau.
*
- Denotes Republican.
95
HOUSE No. 2265
By Mr. Serlin of Boston, petition of I. Edward Serlin that
physicians prescribing certain drugs be required to use generic
names on such prescriptions. Social Welfare.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty-eight.
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE USE OF GENERIC NAMES FOR PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in
General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as
follows:
1 Every registered Massachusetts physician who prescribed
2 drugs for his patients shall in every prescription calling for
3 drugs, use the generic name in addition to the brand name
4 if any.
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SENATE No. 1109
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Senate
,
May 28, 1968.
The committee on Bills in the Third Reading, to whom was
referred the bill providing for the use of generic names for
prescription drugs. (House No. 439b), report recommending
that the same be amended by substituting therefor a new draft
entitled "An Act providing that when a drug is prescribed by
brand name its generic or chemical name shall be included in
the prescription." (Senate No, 1109), and that, when so amended,
the same will be correctly drawn.
For the committee,
JOHN E. HARRINGTON, Jr.
97
2 SENATE - No. 1109 (May 1968.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty-eight.
AN ACT PROVIDING THAT WHEN A DRUG IS PRESCRIBED BY BRAND NAME
ITS GENERIC OR CHEMICAL NAME SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE
PRESCRIPTION.
Be it enacted bv the Senate and House of Representatives in
General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows*
1 Chapter 112 of the General Laws is hereby amended by
2 inserting after section 12B the following sections -
3 Section 12C. Every physician who prescribed a drug by
4 brand name shall, in every such prescription, oral or written,
5 also included the generic name or the chemical name of such
6 drug, if any, whenever, in his opinion, such generically or
7 chemically named drug is the therapeutic or curative equiva-
8 lent of the brand named drug.
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HOUSE No. 425
By Mr. Serlin of Boston, petition of I. Edward Serlin that
physicians prescribing certain drugs be required to use generic
names on such prescriptions. Social Welfare.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Jn the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty-Nine.
AN ACT PROVIDING THAT WHEN A DRUG IS PRESCRIBED BY BRAND
NAME ITS GENERIC OR CHEMICAL NAME SHALL BE INCLUDED IN
THE PRESCRIPTION.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in
General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as
f ollowss
1 Chapter 112 of the General Laws is hereby amended by
2 inserting after section 12B the following sections -
3 Section 12C. Every physician who prescribed a drug by
4 brand name shall, in every such prescription, oral or written,
5 also include the generic name or the chemical name of such
6 drug.
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HOUSE No. 5006
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
House of Representatives, April 22, 1969.
The committee on Bills in the Third Reading, to whom was
referred the Bill providing for the use of generic names for
prescription drugs (House, No. 424) report recommending that
the same be amended bv the substitution of the accompanying
bill (House, No. 5006).
For the committee,
MARY B. NEWMAN.
2 HOUSE - No. 5006
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(Apr. 1969.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty-Nine.
AN ACT PROVIDING THAT WHEN A DRUG IS PRESCRIBED FY BRAND
NAME ITS GENERIC OR CHEMICAL NAME SHALL BE INCLUDED IN
THE PRESCRIPTION.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in
General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as
f ollowsi
1 Chapter 112 of the General Laws is hereby amended by
2 inserting after section 12B the following section:
-
3 Section 12C. Every physician who prescribes a drug by
4 brand name shall, in every such prescription, oral or written,
5 also include the generic name or the chemical name of such
6 drug, if any.
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HOUSE N0 . 2389
By Mr. Healy of Charlemont, petition of Robert S’. Aronson
and other members of the House that provision be made for the use
of generic names of drugs prescribed by physicians. Social
Welfare.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty-Nine.
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS FOR PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS WHEN RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESCRIBING PHYSICIAN.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in
General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same as
follows:
1 Chapter 112 of the General Laws is hereby amended by
2 inserting after section 12B the following section: -
3 Section 12C. A registered physician who prescribes drugs
4 for his patients shall, in every prescription calling for a
5 drug by a brand name, indicate on the prescription whether
6 or not a generic equivalent may be substituted.
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HOUSE No. 523
By Mr. Seriin of Boston, petition of T. Edward Berlin that
physicians prescribing certain drugs be required to use generic
names on such prescriptions. Social ./elf are.
THE COMMONWEALTH CF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy.
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE USE OF GENERIC NAMES FOR PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in
General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as
follows;
1 Every registered Massachusetts physician who prescribes
2 drugs for his patients shall in every prescription calling for
3 drugs, use the generic name in addition to the brand name if
4 any.
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HOUSE No. 5222
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
House of Representatives, March 24, 1970.
The committee on Bills in the Third Reading, to whom was
referred the Bill providing for the use of generic names for
prescription drugs (House, No. 523), report recommending that the
same be amended by the substitution of the accompanying bill
(House, No. 5222).
For the committee,
RAYMOND M. LaFONTAINE.
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2 HOUSE - No. 5222, (Mar. 1970
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy
AN ACT PROVIDING THAT WHEN A DRUG IS PRESCRIBED BY BRAND NAME
ITS GENERIC OR CHEMICAL NAME SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE PRESCRIP-
TION.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in
General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as
f ollows:
1 Chapter 112 of the General Laws is hereby amended by
2 inserting after section 12B the following section: -
3 Section 12C. Every physician who prescribes a drug by
4 brand name shall, in every such prescription, oral or written
5 also include the generic name or the chemical name of such
6 drug, if any.
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SENATE No. 927
By Mr. Kenneally, a petition of George V. Kenneally, Jr. andRonald C. MacKenzie for legislation to establish a drug formularym the Department of Public Health. Social Welfare.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETT
S
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy.
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A DRUG FORMULARY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
HEALTH.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in
General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as
follows:
1 Chapter 17 of the General Laws is hereby amended by
2 adding the following section under the caption DRUG
3 FORMULARY COMMITTEE: -
4 Section 13. There shall be in the department a drug formu™
5 lary committee, hereinafter called the committee, to consist
6 of five members to be appointed by the governor from lists of
7 eligible names to be compiled and prepared by the commis-
8 sioner of public health, the commissioner of public welfare,
9 and the consumers 1 council. Members of the committee shall
10 include individuals possessiong recognized competence in the
11 rendering of professional services under, or the administration
12 of, state health programs, and a majority of the members
13 shall be practicing members of the professions authorized to
14 render professional health services under state-financed
15 health programs. Each member of the committee shall serve
16 at the pleasure of the governor.
17 "The committee shall prepare a formulary of generic or
18 chemical and brand names of drugs and pharmaceuticals
19 which are considered by the committee as effective. The
20 sources for such a document shall include a list of drugs
21 most frequently prescribed by licensed physicians in Massa-
22 chusetts, the formularies of various hospitals in Massachu-
23 setts, and any additional formularies available from any
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24 agency or department of the United States and of other
26 states. The committee shall determine and include in its
26 formulary, with respect to each drug, the maximum amount
27 which will be paid under the state welfare program to
28 vendors, the usual cost of each brand name when obtained
29 by community pharmacists in usual quantities from the
30 most frequently used source of supply, and an index of drug
31 costs to community pharmacists which clearly indicates the
32 degree of cost variation existing between listed brand names
33 used for comparable therapeutic purposes. The committee
34 shall provide for distribution of copies of such formulary
36 and revisions thereto amongst physicians licensed to practic
36 within this commonwealth and to other appropriate indi™
37 viduals and shall supply a copy to any person on request upon
38 payment of cost of printing. Such formulary shall be revised
39 from time to time, but in no event less frequently than once
40 a year, so as to invlude new pertinent information on drugs
41 approved for inclusion or drugs to be deleted and to reflect
42 current information as to drug costs and therapeutic efficacy
43 of drugs and pharmaceuticals. *
44 Any person or party in interest aggrieved by a finding or
46 report of the committee may appeal to the supreme judicial
46 court for a review of such report or finding. For the purposes
47 of this section, the term "brand name" shall mean the name
48 that the manufacturer of such drug places on the container
49 thereof at the time of packaging, and the term "generic
60 name" shall mean the chemical or established name of such
61 drug or pharmaceutical.
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By Mr. Wojtkowski of Pittsfield, petition of the Massachuse:
Chapter Americans for Democratic Action, Thomas C. Wojtkowski
and Paul C. Menton that physicians be required to use generic
names for prescription drugs. Social Welfare,
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy.
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE PRESCRIPTION OF DRUGS BY THEIR GENERIC
NAMES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in
General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as
follows
:
1 Chapter 112 of the General Laws is hereby amended by in-
2 serting after section 12B the following section: -
3 Section 12C. Any preparation prescribed by a physician for
4 which a generic name exists shall be prescribed by its generic
5 name. A brand name may be added to such prescription and
6 shall be supplied by the dispensing pharmacist when in the
7 discretion of the prescribing physician it is so required.
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THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Senate
s April 8 , 1970.
The committee on Ways and Means, to whom was committed
the Senate Bill establishing a drug formulary in the Department
of Public Health (Senate, No. 927) also based on the Senate Bill
establishing the drug policy commission (Senate, No. 979), and
the House Bill providing that when a drug is prescribed by brand
name its generic or chemical name shall be included in the
prescription (House, No. 5222), reports recommending that the bill,
Senate, No. 927, same ought to pass, with an amendment, sub-
stituting a new draft entitled "An Act Establishing a Drug
Formulary Committee in the Department of Public Health" (Senate,
No. 1360).
For the committee,
JAMES F. BURKE
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THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Senate, April 13, 1970.
The committee on Bills in the Third Reading, to whom was
referred the bill establishing a drug formulary committee in the
department of public health (Senate, No. 1360), reports
recommending that the same be amended by substituting therefor
a new draft entitled “An Act establishing a drug formulary
commission in the department of public health and requiring
physicians, when prescribing drugs by brand name, to include
generic or chemical name of such drug" (Senate, No. 1367), and
that, when so amended, the same be correctly drawn.
For the committee,
JOHN E. HARRINGTON, Jr.
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THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy.
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A DRUG FORMULARY COMMISSION IN THE DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND REQUIRING PHYSICIANS, WHEN PRESCRIBING DRUGS
BY BRAND NAME
,
TO INCLUDE THE GENERIC OR CHEMICAL NAMES OF SUCH
DRUGS.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in
General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as
follows:
1 Section 1. Chapter 17 of the General Laws is hereby
2 amended by adding the following caption and section: -
3 CHUG FORMULARY COMMISSION
4 Section 13. There shall be in the department a drug formu-
5 lary commission, hereinafter called the commission, to con-
6 sist of five members to be appointed by the governor from
7 lists of eligible names to be compiled and prepared by the
8 commissioner of public health, the commissioner of public
9 welfare, and the consumers’ council. Members of the commis-
10 sion shall be individuals possessing recognized competence in
11 the rendering of professional services under, or the adminis-
12 tration of, state health programs, and a majority of the mem-
13 bers shall be practicing members of the professions authorized
14 to render professional health services under state-financed
15 health programs; provided, however, that not more than one
16 member of said commission shall be a registered pharmacist.
17 Each member of the commission shall serve at the pleasure
18 of the governor.
19. The commission shall prepare a formulary of generic or
20 chemical, and brand names of drugs and pharmaceuticals
21 considered by the commission as effective. The sources for
22 such document shall include a list of drugs most frequently
23 prescribed by licensed physicians in Massachusetts, the for-
24 mularies of various hospitals in Massachusetts, and any addi-
25 tional formularies available from any agency or department
26 of the United States and of other states, but shall not include
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27 drugs which are the subject matter of rights issued by the
28 United States Patent Office or obtained under the laws relating
29 to trade names and trade marks. The commission shall pro-
30 vide for distribution of copies of such formulary and revisi-
31 sions thereto amongst physicians licensed to practice within
32 the commonwealth and to other appropriate individuals, and
33 shall supply a copy to any person on request upon payment
34 of the cost of printing. Such formulary shall be revised from
35 time to time, but in no event less frequently than once a
36 year, so as to include new pertinent information on drugs
37 approved for inclusion or drugs to be deleted and to reflect
38 current information as to the therapeutic efficacy of drugs and
39 pharmaceuticals.
40 Any person or party in interest aggrieved by a finding or
41 report of the commission shall be entitled to a judicial review
42 thereof as provided in section fourteen of chapter thirty A.
43 For the purposes cf this section, the term “brand name” shall
44 mean the name that the manufacturer of such drug places
45 on the container thereof at the time of packaging, and the
46 term "generic name" shall mean the chemical or established
47 name of such drug or pharmaceutical.
1 Section 2. Chapter 112 of the General Laws is hereby
2 amended by inserting after section 12C the following sec-
3 tion: -
4 Section 12D. Every physician who prescribes a drug listed
5 in the formulary prepared by the drug formulary commission
6 under section thirteen of chapter seventeen by brand name
7 shall, in each such prescription, oral or written, also include
8 the generic name or the chemical name of such drug, if any.
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Accompanying the twelfth recommendation of the Department of
Public Health (House 5 No. 170). Social Welfare.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-three.
AN ACT AMENDING THE DRUG FORMULARY LAW.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in
General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as
follows:
1 SECTION 1. Chapter 112 of the General Laws is hereby
2 amended by striking out section 12D and inserting therefor the
3 following: -
4 Section 12D. A pharmacist shall on receipt of an oral or
5 written prescription containing the name of a drug indicated by
6 brand or generic ly, dispense an equivalent generic drug listed in
7 the formulary prepared by the drug formulary commission under
8 section thirteen of chapter seventeen, which is the least expensive
9 such drug. If in the opinion of a physician an equivalent generic
10 drug should not be dispensed, he may indicate in the manner of
11 his choice on the prescription "Do Not Substitute" except that
12 the indication shall not be pre-printed on a prescription.
1 SECTION 2. Section 13 of chapter 17 of the General Laws
2 as inserted by Chapter 717 of the acts of 1970, is hereby
3 amended by striking out the word "five" in the first sentence and
4 substituting therefor the word: - seven.
1 SECTION 3. Said section 13 is further amended by striking
2 out the second sentence and substituting therefor the following
3 sentence: - Five members of the commission shall be individuals
4 possessing recognized competence in the rendering of pro-
5 fessicnal" services under, or the administration of, state health
6 programs at least one of whom shall be a registered pharmacist,
7 and two members shall be selected from the public sector, one c
8 whom shall represent the elderly? provided that not less than
9 three members shall be practicing members of the professions
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10 authorized to render professional health services under state-
11 financed health programs.
1 SECTION 4. Said section 13 is further amended by adding at
2 the end of the fifth sentence thereof the following: - except
3 when such patented drugs are available from more than one
4 manufacturer.
1 SECTION 5. Said section 13 is further amended by adding at
2 the end of the second paragraph thereof, the following sen-
3 tence: - The commission shall promulgate such regulations and
4 formularies as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the
b formulary, with the approval of the commissioner.
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THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Senate, June 4, 1975.
The committee on Health Care, to whom was referred the
petition (accompanied by bill, Senate No. 673) of Alan D. Sisitsky
and Chester G. Atkins for legislation to clarify the generic drug
law; so much of the recommendations of the Department of Public
Health (House, No. 262) as relates to amending the drug formulary
law (House, No. 263); the petition (accompanied by bill, House,
No. 1111) of Michael F. Flaherty relative to amending the drug
formulary law; the petition (accompanied by bill. House, No. 2099)
of the Americans for Democratic Action, John G. King, Angelo M.
Scaccia, Charles F. Flaherty, Jr.
,
James Segel, Ronald A. Pina,
Melvin H. King, Doris Bunte, Barney Frank, William D. Delahunt
and Ann C. Gannett for legislation to promote quality medication
at reasonable costs; and the petition (accompanied by bill, House,
No. 3858) of Thomas G. Simons and others for legislation to clarify
the generic drug law reports the accompanying bill (Senate, No.
1947).
For the Committee,
ROGER L. BERNASHE
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THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Mine Hundred and Seventy-Five.
AN ACT CLARIFYING THE GENERIC DRUG LAW.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in
General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as
f ollows:
1 Section 1. As used in this Act, the following words shall
2 unless the context clearly requires otherwise, have the follow-
3 ing meanings:
4 '‘department", the department of public health.
b "interchangeable drug product", a product containing a
6 drug or drugs in the same amounts of the same active ingredi-
7 ents in the same dosage form as other products with the same
8 generic or chemical name.
9 "practitioner", a physician, dentist, veterinarian, podiatrist,
10 scientific investigator or other person registered to distribute,
11 dispense conduct research with respect to, or use in teaching
12 or chemical analysis, a controlled substance in the course of
13 professional practice or research in the commonwealth;
1 Section 2. Section 13 of Chapter 17 of the General Laws, as
2 most recently amended by Section 1 of Chapter 717 of the
3 Acts of 1970, is hereby further amended by striking said sec-
4 tion, and inserting in place thereof the following new sec-
b tion: -
6 Section 13. There shall be in the department a Drug Formu-
7 lary Commission to consist of eight members appointed by the
8 Governor. Three shall be practitioners at least two of whom
9 shall be physicians. Three shall be pharmacists, possessing
10 among them experience in clinical pharmacy, clinical pharma-
11 cology, and pharmaceutical chemistry, one of whom shall have
12 had experience with retail pharmacy and one with
13 experience in pharmaceutical manufacturing but none of
14 whom may be affiliated with any manufacturer in particular.
lb Two members shall be lay persons, not involved in the delivery
16 of health care services; provided, that one of two lay appointees
17 shall, by reason of age, training, experience, and/or affiliation
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18 represent the interests of the elderly.
19. Members shall serve for a term of three years, except, in
20 the incidence of the first appointments under the provisions
21 of this Act, three shall be appointed for a term of three years,
22 three shall be appointed for a term of two years, and two shall
23 be appointed for a term of one year, so that the terms of future
24 members shall be staggered.
25 The Commission shall prepare a drug formulary of inter-
26 changeable drug products to be adopted by regulation by the
27 Department of Public Health. Said formulary shall be based
28 on assessment and evaluation of the present Massachusetts
29 drug formulary prepared by the Drug Formulary Commission
30 under section thirteen of chapter seventeen of the General
31 Laws;
32 The latest official national formulary, or any supplement
33 to any of them, additional pertinent listings of the federal
34 Department of Health Education and Welfare, Food and Drug
35 Administration; other state formularies; those of foreign
36 countries; and the formularies of various hospitals of the
37 Commonwealth, as well as data submitted by manufacturers.
38 The Commission shall assess and evaluate chemical and
39 laboratory testing data, clinical proof of bioequivalence and
40 therapeutic equivalence where available.
41 Said formulary shall not include drugs which are the subject
42 matter of patent rights issued by the United States Patent
43 Office. It shall not include those drug products for which bio-
44 equivalence is considered essential according to findings of
45 on-going federal testing.
46 Said formulary shall take effect no later than twelve months
47 from the effective date of this Act.
1 Section 3. Chapter 112 of the General Laws, as most re-
2 cently amended by Section 2 of Chapter 717 of the Acts of
3 1970, is hereby further amended by striking section 12D, and
4 inserting in place thereof the following new sections: -
5 Section 12D. Every prescription written in the Common-
6 wealth by a practitioner shall be on prescription forms con-
7 taining two lines for the practitioner signature. Alongside the
8 first line shall be clearly printed the words ’'interchange per-
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9
mitted"? instructing the pharmacist to use an interchangeable
10 drug product as listed in the formulary. Alongside the second
11 signature line shall be clearly printed the words "dispense as
12 written."
13 The practitioner, by placing his signature on the appropri-
14 ate signature line, has indicated his dispensing instructions
15 to the pharmacist. Failure of the practitioner to affix his
16 signature on one of the designated lines shall invalidate the
17 prescription.
18 In cases where an interchange is permitted, as indicated by
19 the prescriber’s signature on the first signature line, the
20 pharmacist shall dispense a less expensive reasonably available
21 interchange drug product as listed in the most current formu-
22 lary or supplement thereof. He shall also indicate on the label
23 the fact of interchange and the exact drug product dispensed.
24 In cases where the practitioner has instructed that the
25 pharmacist dispense as written, the pharmacist shall dispense
26 the exact drug product as written by the petitioner.
27 Proper forms for prescriptions are to be available no later
28 than six months from the effective date of this Act.
29 Section 12E. Every pharmacy shall display in a prominent
30 place that is in clear and unobstructed public view at or near
31 the place where prescriptions are dispensed, a sign in block
32 letters not less than one inch in height, which shall read:
33 "CONSULT YOUR PHYSICIAN CONCERNING THE AVAIL-
34 ABILITY OF THE LEAST EXPENSIVE DRUG FOR YOUR
35 USE - IF MEDICALLY ADVISABLE, GENERIC DRUGS
36 MAY BE LESS COSTLY."
37 Section 12F. In the event of noncompliance by a pharmacist,
38 the drug purchaser or consumer may inform the Secretary of
39 Consumer Affairs of said noncompliance, who shall refer the
40 matter to the Attorney General of the Commonwealth for
41 appropriate action.
42 Section 12G. The Department of Public Health in coopera-
43 tion with its Formulary Commission shall be responsible for
44 public education regarding the provisions of this Act.
1 Section 4. This act shall take effect upon passage.
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By Messrs. Bertonazzi of Milford, and Cusack of Arlinqton.petition of Louis P. Bertonazzi, John F. Cussack and William C.Mullm ior legislation to clarify the generic drug law. HealthCare.
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Six.
AN ACT CLARIFYING THE GENERIC DRUG LAW.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in
General Court assembled, and by the authority of the same, as
follows:
1 SECTION k. As used in this Act, the following words shall,
2 unless the context clearly requires otherwise, have the following
3 meanings:
4 "department”, the department of public health.
5 "interchangeable drug product”, a product containing a drug
6 or drugs in the same amounts of the same active ingredients in the
7 same dosage form as other products with the same generic or
8 chemical name.
9 "practitioner", a physician, dentist, veterinarian, podiatrist,
10 scientific investigator or other person registered to distribute,
11 dispense, conduct research with respect to, or use in teaching or
12 chemical analysis, a controlled substance in the course of
13 professional practice or research in the commonwealth.
14 The Commission shall prepare a drug formulary of in-
15 terchangeable drug products to be adopted by regulation by the
16 Department of Public Health. Said formulary shall be based on
17 assessment and evaluation of the present Massachusetts Drug
18 formulary prepared by the Drug Formulary Commission under
19 section thirteen of chapter seventeen of the General Laws; the U.
20 S. Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to any of them, additional
21 pertinent listings of the federal Department of Health, Education
22 and Welfare, Food and Drug Administration; other state
23 formularies; and the formularies of various hospitals of the
24 Commonwealth, as well as data submitted by manufacturers. I he
25 Commission shall assess and evaluate chemical and laboratory
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26 565 1.100 data
s clinical proof of bioequivalence and therapGutic
27 equivalence where available.
23 Said formulary shall not include drugs which are the subject
29 matter of patent rights issued by the United States Patent Office.30 It shall not include those drug products for which bioequivalence
31 is considered essential according uo findings oi on—uoino federal
32 testing.
33 Said formulary shall take effect no later than twelve months
34 from the effective date of this Act.
1 SECTION 2. Section 13 of Chapter 17 of the General Laws, as
2 most recently amended by Section 1 of Chapter 717 of the Acts of
3 1970. is hereby further amended by striking said section, and
4 inserting in place thereof the following new section: -
5 Section 13, There shall be in the department a Drug
6 Formulary Commission to consist of eight members appointed by
7 the Governor. There shall be pharmacists, possessing among
8 them experience in clinical pharmacy, clinical pharmacology, and
9 pharmaceutical chemistry, one of whom shall have had
10 experience with retail pharmacy and one with experience in
11 pharmaceutical manufacturing but none of whom may be
12 affiliated ’with any manufacturer in particular. Two members
13 shall be lay persons, not involved in the delivery of health care
14 services; provided, that one of two lay appointees shall, by reason
15 of age, training, experience, and/or affiliation represent the
16 interests of the elderly.
17, Members shall serve for a term of three years, except, in the
18 incidence of the first appointments under the provisions of this
19 Act, three shall be appointed for a term of three years, three
20 shall be appointed for a term of two years, and two shall be ap-
21 pointed for a term of one year, so that the terms of future members
22 shall be staggered.
1 SECTION 3. Chapter 112 of the General Laws, as most
2 recently amended by Section 2 of Chapter 717 of the Acts of 1970,
3 is hereby further amended by striking section 12D, and inserting
4 in place thereof the following new sections: -
5 Section 12D. Every prescription written in the _ Com-
6 monwealth by a practitioner shall be on prescription forms
7 containing two lines for the practitioner signature. Alongside
8 the first line shall be clearly printed the words "interchange
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9
permitted"; instructing the pharmacist to use an interchangeable
10 drug product as listed in the formulary. Alongside the second
11 signature line shall be clearly printed the words "dispense as
12 written."
13 The practitioner, by placing his signature on the appropriate
14 signature line, has indicated his dispensing instructions to the
15 pharmacist. Failure of the practitioner to affix his signature on
16 one of the designated lines shall invalidate the prescription.
17 In cases where an interchange is permitted, as indicated by the
18 pre scriber* s signature on the first signature line, the pharmacist
19 shall dispense a less expensive reasonably available interchange
20 drug product as listed in the most current formulary or
21 supplement thereof. He shall also indicate on the label the fact of
22 interchange and the exact drup product dispensed. In cases where
23 the practitioner has instructed that the pharmacist dispense as
24 written, the pharmacist shall dispense the exact drug product as
25 written by the petitioner.
26 Proper forms for prescriptions are to be available no later than
27 six months from the effective date of this Act.
28 Section 12E. Every pharmacy shall display in a prominent
29 place that is in clear and unobstructed public view at or near the
30 place where prescriptions are dispensed, a sign in block letters not
31 less than one inch in height, which shall read: "CONSULT
32 YOUR PHYSICIAN CONCERNING THE AVAILABILITY
33 OF THE LEAST EXPENSIVE DRUG FOR YOUR USE - IF
34 MEDICALLY ADVISABLE, GENERIC DRUGS MAY BE
35 LESS COSTLY."
36 Section 12F. In the event of noncompliance by a pharmacist,
37 the drug purchaser or consumer may inform the Secretary of
38 Consumer Affairs of such noncompliance, who shall refer the
39 matter to the Attorney General of the Commonwealth for
40 appropriate action.
41 ' Section 12G. The Department of Public Health in cooperation
42 with its Formulary Commission shall be responsible for public
43 education regarding the provisions of this Act.
1 SECTION 4. This act shall take effect upon passage.


